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A New "I Do": 
Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax 
Shari Motro' 
ABSTRACT: The federal income tax system treats married couples as if each 
spouse earned approximately one-half of the couple's combined income 
through a mechanism called "income splitting. " For many one-earner and 
unequal-earner couples, income splitting produces a significant advantage, 
a "marriage bonus," by shifting income from higher to lower rate brackets. 
Marriage-based income splitting relies on a presumption that marriage is a 
good indicator of economic unity between two taxpayers. It is not. Marriage 
does not require spousal sharing, and many unmarried couples share 
everything they earn. As a result, the current system extends the benefit of 
income splitting to some taxpayers who do not deserve it while withholding it 
from others who do. Because marriage is a poor proxy for economic unity, 
this Article proposes a new eligibility criterion for income-splitting: only 
couples legally committed to sharing their income, regardless of marital 
status, would be permitted to file jointly. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current "married filing jointly" federal income tax schedule 
effectively treats each spouse as if he or she earns approximately one-half of 
the couple's combined income. This "income splitting" mechanism 
translates into a significant advantage for unequal- and one-earner couples 
by shifting income from higher to lower brackets. 1 For example, a husband 
and wife who earn $700,000 and $15,000 respectively owe nearly $4,000 less 
in federal income taxes than an unmarried couple with the same income 
distribution. 2 If the wife has no income at all, the spouses' "marriage 
bonus"-i.e., the difference between their tax liability and that of an 
unmarried one-earner couple making $700,000-jumps to more than 
$8,000.3 Some equal-earner couples, on the other hand, suffer a "marriage 
penalty"-i.e., they pay more in taxes than unmarried couples in the same 
• • 4 SituatiOn. 
Why should marital status matter for tax purposes? 
Traditional justifications for the current joint filing system rely on the 
presumption that husband and wife form an economic unit, jointly owning 
and controlling all income regardless of who nominally earned it. This 
presumption is false. In fact, no necessary connection exists between marital 
status and economic unity. Most states require only minimal spousal sharing, 
and premarital agreements ensuring that spouses have no rights to each 
other's income are no longer a rarity. Even if marriage were a reasonably 
good proxy for income sharing, according to foundational income tax 
principles, economic unity does not in itself justify income splitting. 
As critics like Pamela Gann, Maijorie Kornhauser, Edward McCaffery, 
and Lawrence Zelenak have demonstrated, the conceptual inconsistencies 
1. The Appendix to this Article illustrates the arithmetical advantage of income splitting 
for couples with widely divergent incomes. 
2. Using the 2006 rate tables and standard deduction and personal exemption amounts, 
the husband's tax liability as an unmarried individual taking the standard deduction (at this 
income level he would not be eligible for the personal exemption), would be $223,058. The 
wife's tax liability as an unmarried individual taking the standard deduction and the personal 
exemption would be $655. Alternatively, the husband and wife's tax liability as a married couple 
taking a double standard deduction would be $219,895.50. Thus, the difference between the 
sum of their individual liabilities were they single and their liability as a married couple, is: 
($223,058+$655 )-$219,895.50=$3,817.50. 
3. If the wife had no income of her own, her individual liability would be 0, and the 
couple's combined liability would be $214,645.50. Thus, the difference between the sum of 
their individual liabilities were they single and their liability as a married couple, is: ($223,058 + 
$0)-$214,645.50=$8,412.50. This calculation disregards I.R.C. § 151 (d) (3) (E) (2000). 
Note that the terms "marriage bonus" and "marriage penalty" may refer to various tax 
advantages and disadvantages of being married. This Article focuses exclusively on bonuses and 
penalties associated with the rate structure. 
4. For a discussion of the marriage penalty, which affects fewer couples than the 
marriage bonus, see infra Part II.B.l. 
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and the negative effects of marriage-based income-splitting would vanish if 
Congress instituted a separate filer regime.5 However, though mandatory 
separate filing has many appeals, it is now widely regarded as politically 
unrealistic. 6 
One explanation for the permanence of the income-splitting joint 
return is that its main alternative, a pure separate filing regime, would 
require that husbands and wives account for intra-marital transfers as either 
"gifts" or "compensation." In the case of economically united spouses, such a 
requirement is culturally undesirable, administratively unmanageable, and 
conceptually inaccurate. We are most comfortable viewing spouses who 
share their income as earning it "by and for" the marital unit rather than as 
individuals. The revenue we forgo by allowing spouses to split income may 
therefore be viewed as the price we are willing to pay to live in a society in 
which spouses need not commodify the flow of goods and services within the 
marital unit. The deviation from normative tax principles that results from 
income-splitting joint returns is tolerated in order to support and enable a 
unique type of relationship-a partnership of equals in which "what's mine 
is yours, and what's yours is mine." 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this justification suggests that the proper 
criterion for income splitting should be economic unity, not marriage. Thus, 
I propose that tax law consider individuals' legally binding economic status 
independent of their marital status, and that only couples committed to 
sharing all taxable income equally should be treated as such for tax 
purposes. Rising public awareness of the discriminatory effects of marriage-
based benefits,7 growing support for the extension of many of these benefits 
to unmarried couples-gay8 and straight9-and census findings over the past 
5. See generally Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax 
Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. I (I980); Maljorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, 
Income-Sharing, and the joint Income Tax Return, 45 HAsTINGS LJ. 63 (I993); Edward]. McCaffery, 
Taxation and the Family: A fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 
(1993); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994). 
6. Zelenak's latest contribution to the debate over marriage and taxes assumes that the 
separate filing cause is hopeless and, more broadly, that any marriage-neutral tax system is also 
"out of the question." Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REv. I, 3 (2000); see also infra note 88. This Article accepts Zelenak's first 
assumption-that income splitting is here to stay-but departs from the second-the notion 
that marital status must necessarily continue to serve as the eligibility criterion for income 
splitting. 
7. See Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 2004, available at 
http:/ /www.thenation.com/doc/200403I5/duggan; Shari Motro, The State of the Unions; Single 
and Paying for It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at I5; Alternatives to Marriage Project, 
http:/ /www.unmarried.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2006); Unmarried America: An Information 
Service for the New Unmarried Majority, http:/ /www.unmarriedamerica.org (last visited Mar. 
23, 2006) [hereinafter Unmarried America] (highlighting the discrepancies between married 
and single statuses). 
8. See Lisa Duggan & Richard Kim, Beyond Gay Marriage, THE NATION,July IS-26, 2005, at 
25 ("Large majorities favor employment and housing rights for gay people (89 percent in the 
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few decades that indicate a move away from traditional family structures10 
provide an opportunity and an imperative to reexamine the assumptions 
that have undergirded the system of marriage-based joint returns for more 
than fifty years. 
By including economically united unmarried couples in the joint filing 
system, the economic unity proposal extends income-splitting benefits to 
unmarried couples in a way that is sensitive to and consistent with the beliefs 
latest Gallup poll), and a clear majority of Americans support some form of partnership 
recognition for same-sex couples-either marriage or civil unions (60 percent at the time of the 
election)."); Kristin Eliasberg, Legal Scholars Ask if Marriage Is the Only Way to Make a Family, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2004, at E1 ("When same-sex couples across the state are finally 
allowed to take their wedding vows tomorrow, some advocates say, the law will at last be 
catching up with the long-standing social transformation that has made committed gay couples, 
and gay families, an undeniable part of American life."); N.Y. TIMES & CBS, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES/CBS NEWS POLL 16 (Feb. 24-28, 2005), available at 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20050303_poll/20050303_poll_results.pdf 
(indicating fifty-three percent to fifty-seven percent support for some type of legal recognition 
for gay couples, either marriage or civil union). Furthermore,John Tierney notes: 
Opinion on gay marriage and civil unions has fluctuated over the past year, but a 
Gallup poll last month showed increased support, with more than a third of 
Americans in favor of gay marriage and about half in favor of civil unions. The 
long-term trend has been to a great tolerance toward gays. The percentage of 
Americans favoring equal rights for homosexuals in employment has risen since 
1977 by more than a third to about 80 percent today. Support for gay rights has 
become especially strong among young voters, which suggests that the trend will 
continue. 
John Tierney, A Nation Divided Who Says?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1. 
Other articles indicate: 
Public support for allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally has rebounded a bit 
after declining between 2003 and 2004. Today, 36% of Americans favor allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry, up from 32% in December 2004. The percentage 
favoring gay civil unions has risen as well. Currently, 53% favor allowing gays and 
lesbians to enter into legal arrangements providing them with many of the same 
rights as married couples; that compares with 48% last August. 
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, STRONG SUPPORT FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH, ABORTION 
AND RIGHTS OF TERROR SUSPECTS TOP COURT ISSUES 12 (2005), available at 
http:/ /pewforum.org/publications/surveys/social-issues-OS.pdf; see also Patricia A. Cain, 
Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 287-88 (2002) 
(summarizing examples of tax treatment based on marital status that fail to meet the goal of 
supporting dependent children); Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue 
Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465, 491-95 (2000) (explaining the numerous harms associated with 
preferential tax treatment for only heterosexual married people). 
9. See Unmarried America, supra note 7. 
10. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., For Richer, For Poorer: How Tax Policymakers Have 
Protected and Punished American Families, 1913-2006, at 3-4 (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Iowa Law Review). 
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of a m~ority of Americans-including many conservatives like President 
Bush11 who support civil unions, but oppose gay marriage. 12 By excluding 
economically independent spouses, the proposal also comports with 
conservative support for stronger marital commitments. Finally, economic 
unity-based income splitting is consistent with the widely accepted public 
policy goal of greater gender equality in intimate partnerships. 
Part II of this Article critiques the traditional foundations for marriage-
based income splitting and describes the current system's harmful effects. 
Part III suggests a new theoretical foundation for income splitting-the "by 
and for the couple" justification-and shows why it demands that the 
current eligibility criterion for income splitting be replaced. Part IV 
introduces the economic unity proposal. At its core, the proposal amounts 
to a simple demand for conceptual rigor and transparency. The current 
system is founded on a sentimentalized ideal of marital unity, replicating 
and perpetuating the fairytale that has devastated so many dependent 
spouses. The new "I do" would force the tax system to acknowledge reality, 
allowing only those truly united to be taxed as one. 
II. MARRIAGE-BASED INCOME SPLITTING IS INDEFENSIBLE 
A. TRADITIONAL jUSTIFICATIONS FOR INCOME SPUTTING 
The U.S. federal income tax imposes taxes on realized accessions in 
wealth over which the taxpayer has complete dominion. 13 Increases m 
wealth are generally measured by adding the taxpayer's receipts-including 
wage income, interest, and gains from sales or exchanges-and subtracting 
(deducting) expenditures made for the purpose of producing income-like 
compensation paid to employees and the purchase of business-related 
equipment. Non-business-related expenditures ("personal consumption") 
and investments-like buying a candy bar and depositing money into a 
savings account-are generally nondeductible. 14 
11. President George W. Bush voiced his opinion in an interview: 
CHARLES GIBSON: ... the [Republican Party] platform opposes [civil unions]. 
PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I don't. I view the definition of marriage different from 
legal arrangements that enable people to have rights. And I strongly believe that 
marriage ought to be defined as between, a union between a man and a woman. 
See Interview by Charles Gibson with President George W. Bush, on Good 
Morning America, ABC News Transcripts (Oct. 26, 2004), available at 
http:/ /www.evervigilant.net/news/gmatranscript102604.html. 
12. See supra note 7. 
13. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The normative base for the 
Glenshaw formulation and for the current tax system is the Haig-Simon definition of income as 
the sum of consumption and savings. Though Haig-Simon provides the theoretical foundation 
of our current system, many provisions deviate from the pure income tax model, rendering the 
overall system a hybrid income/consumption tax. For further discussion see infra note 55. 
14. I.R.C. § 262 (2000). 
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The tax treatment of transfers between unmarried taxpayers generally 
(though not always) follows this logic. Transfers between unmarried 
individuals often fall into one of three categories for tax purposes: 
compensation for business-related services, compensation for personal 
services, or gifts. Compensatory transfers are distinguished from gifts for tax 
purposes if they involve a quid pro quo, i.e., if they are not made out of 
"'detached and disinterested generosity. "' 15 Compensation for business-
related services (everything from photocopying to strategy consulting) is 
deductible to the payor16 and must be included by the payee!7 
Compensation for personal services (like housekeeping, food preparation, 
and hairdressing) may not be deducted by the payor18 and must be included 
by the payee. 19 Gifts have no income tax consequences to either the donor 
(they are considered a form of personal consumption20 ) or donee.21 
These same categories govern situations in which one taxpayer assigns 
her income to another-e.g., by directing her employer to pay part of her 
salary to someone else or by contractually committing to deposit her income 
into an account owned jointly with another individual.22 In other words, 
unless the assignment is characterized as compensation or other includable 
form of income to the payee, it is a gift; the assignor must pay taxes on the 
income and the assignee need not. One of the rationales for this 
"assignment of income doctrine" is to prevent high-bracket taxpayers from 
shifting income to friends and family in lower brackets, thereby lowering the 
rate at which this income is taxed. If income shifting were permitted, 
transfers that were in substance gifts could effectively be treated as if they 
were business expenses: the donor would deduct them and the donee would 
include them and pay taxes according to her own tax bracket. To prevent 
this result, a guiding principle that "'income must be taxed to him who 
15. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 
243, 246 (1956)). 
16. I.R.C. § 162(a). 
17. Id. § 61(a)(1). 
18. ld. § 262(a). 
19. Id.§61(a)(1). 
20. A man who gives his girlfriend a diamond necklace, the argument goes, is engaging in 
the same type of activity as someone who buys himself a fancy car. See Pauicia A. Cain, Same-Sex 
Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAw & SEXUALI1Y97, 102-03, nn. 27-29 (1991). 
21. The exclusion of gifts under I.R.C. § 102 is more difficult to square with the Haig-
Simon definition of income. For a discussion of why gifts are excluded from income, see 1 
BORIS I. BIITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 'l[ 
10.1 (2005). 
22. For a discussion of assignments of income, see id. 'li 75.2. 
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earns it"'23 has become, as the Supreme Court put it, "'a cornerstone of our 
d d 0 ,,24 gra uate mcome tax system. 
This principle was established in the famous Supreme Court case Lucas 
v. Earl/5 which was decided in 1930 before the advent of the joint return. 
The case concerned Guy and Ella Earl, a one-earner married couple who 
had privately contracted to share all income. The Earls claimed that each 
spouse should be taxed based on one-half of Guy's income. The Supreme 
Court rejected their claim on the theory that Congress intended to "tax 
salaries to those who earned them," and that the Earls' contract essentially 
represented an end-run around this rule, a skillful arrangement devised-as 
Holmes famously put it-to attribute the fruits to "a different tree from that 
h . h th ,26 on w 1c ey grew. 
Lucas v. Earl still applies to most taxpayers. However, transfers between 
spouses are subject to a different rule.27 The current system disregards 
transfers between spouses,28 and the rate schedules applicable to married 
individuals filing jointll9 treat each spouse as if he or she earns 
approximatell0 one-half of the couple's combined income through a 
mechanism called "income splitting." As a result, many married couples with 
unequal incomes pay less in taxes than they would if each person filed 
individually, because income splitting effectively attributes income earned by 
the high wage earner to the low wage earner, thereby lowering the top rate 
23. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 75-110 (quoting Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 
u.s. 733, 739-40 (1949)). 
24. See id. (quoting United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441,450 (1973)). 
25. 281 u.s. 111 (1930). 
26. !d. at 115. 
27. Note that the head of household category also establishes an exception to the doctrine 
for reasons that have historically related to the income-splitting joint return, though 
conceptually the link is erroneous. See infra note 122. 
28. I.R.C. § 1041 (2000). 
29. Note that though spouses technically have the option of filing separately, in most cases 
doing so imposes penalties that render separate filing rare. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2005 
ANNUAL REPORT 424 (citing TAS RESEARCH, TAX YEAR 2003 !RTF DATA (2005)) ("Ninety seven 
percent of all married filers ... submittedjoint returns for tax year 2003 .... ").Furthermore, 
Bittker notes: 
The split-income plan enacted in 1948 included a favorable rate schedule for joint 
returns; joint returns were optional in theory, but the new rate schedule was an 
offer "that could not be refused" (except in special circumstances) and this meant 
that joint returns became mandatory in fact for almost all married couples. 
Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1408-09 n.55 
(1975) (citation omitted). This Article therefore disregards the married filing separately option. 
30. When the joint return was first introduced in 1948, married taxpayers' liability was 
equal to exactly that of two single taxpayers each earning one-half of the couple's combined 
income. Once the special brackets for married taxpayers were introduced in 1969, "pure" 
income splitting gave way to an approximation, which in turn produced a penalty for some two-
earner couples. See infra Appendix. 
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at which this income is taxed.31 The resulting advantage is referred to as the 
"marriage bonus." The Appendix illustrates the historical evolution of the 
taxation of married couples from Earl v. Lucas and Poe v. Seaborn32 through 
the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. Although the 
yearly value of marriage bonuses is difficult to measure, all estimates peg it at 
tens of billions of dollars. 33 
Why should married couples be subject to a special rule? Leaving aside 
the historical circumstances that led Congress to institute marriage-based 
income splitting,34 four ex post facto justifications for retaining the system 
have been proposed. All four rely on the false presumption that husband 
and wife necessarily form an economic unit. But even if marriage were 
synonymous with complete economic unity-i.e., if all husbands and wives 
jointly and equally owned, controlled, managed, and consumed every dollar 
of taxable income earned by either-the traditional justifications for income 
splitting are conceptually inconsistent with foundational principles of the 
current income tax system. 
1. Joint Ownership Justification 
Spouses-only income splitting is often defended as an adjustment 
necessary to properly account for true changes in married taxpayers' net 
worth. A husband whose non-wage-earning wife automatically owns part or 
all of his income would be overtaxed, the argument goes, if he were liable 
for taxes on his full salary. This approach views transfers between spouses as 
different from gifts between unmarried taxpayers and from personal 
31. This effect exists only in systems with a progressive rate structure. See Zelenak, supra 
note 5, at 340 ("Under a progressive tax, two single persons with any given amount of combined 
income will pay the lowest combined tax if their income is divided evenly between them."). This 
Article presumes a progressive rate structure as a constant. 
32. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
33. See jANE G. GRAVELLE, THE MARRIAGE TAX PENALlY 51-52 (2003). Gravelle explains 
this difficulty: 
It is not possible to measure the marriage ... bonus precisely because the taxes a 
married couple would pay as two singles depends on the division of unearned 
income, itemized deductions, and the custody of children. When children are 
allocated based on typical observed behavior, the Congressional Budget Office has 
estimated ... that ... 60% [of married couples] have bonuses ($73 billion). 
!d.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (1997) (noting that in 1996, marriage bonuses cost the federal 
government approximately $33 billion in lost revenues); Ventry, supra note 10, at 4 ("In 2004, 
30 million married couples received $49 billion in marriage tax 'bonuses' .... " (citing Gillette 
et al., Marriage Penalties and Bonuses: A Longer-Term Perspective 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review))). 
34. Zelenak has called the original joint return "an accident of history." Zelenak, supra 
note 6, at 5. For further discussion of the historical circumstances surrounding its adoption, see 
generally Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Rnles in the 
1940s, 6 LAw & HIST. REV. 259 (1988); Ventry, supra note 10. 
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consumption expenditures, because marriage is said to change, 
fundamentally and irreversibly, people's legal, emotional, and social control 
over their income. Once two people marry, both spouses are viewed as 
having the power to decide how income nominally earned by either will be 
spent and invested. Thus, unlike the decision to buy a new car or help an 
unrelated friend pay her rent, sharing income with one's spouse is not a 
decision at all; it is an inescapable obligation. As Bittker put it: 
Marriage affects the legal rights of each spouse to what would 
otherwise be "his" or "her" unfettered income by creating an 
obligation of support and restrictions on the right to transfer 
property during life and at death. Since the receipt of $10,000 of 
marital income does not carry with it the same rights that are 
embodied in $10,000 of "single" income, these two amounts should 
not necessarily be taxed as though they were identical. Instead, it is 
often argued, marital income should be attributed, and taxed, one-
3' half to each spouse. " 
However, though marriage does create minimal support obligations, no 
necessary connection exists between shared ownership over income and 
marriage. In the forty-one states that apply common-law principles to 
marital-property matters, the wage earner is the wage owner during 
marriage.36 Thus, if husband and wife decide that she will raise the kids and 
he will support the family financially, the husband is free to deposit his salary 
in a separate account to which his wife has no legal entitlement. The 
husband would be obligated to support the family, but the extent of this 
support, beyond providing bare necessities, would be at his discretion.37 
35. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1420 (citations omitted). Before Congress extended income 
splitting to all married couples, this theoretical justification propelled demands for income-
splitting tax treatment by couples in the 1920s, and it played a central role in judicial opinions 
granting such treatment. When income taxes were first imposed in 1913, each taxpayer's 
liability was calculated on an individual basis. The idea that marital status should affect income 
tax liability was introduced by a number of couples who were legally obligated to share their 
income. During early debates about the proper taxable unit, it was generally assumed that if 
income splitting were appropriate at all, marriage alone did not render a couple sufficiently 
economically united to justifY income splitting treatment. Something more was needed, though 
there was plenty of debate over what that something was. Ella and Guy Earl, for example, 
petitioners in the famous Lucas v. Earl Supreme Court case, based their income-splitting claim 
on a contract they had executed as early as 1901, in which they committed to share equally all 
income and property. Without the legal obligation to share income, their claim would have had 
no logical basis. See id. at 1402 ("[I]t was only by equalizing their financial positions that [the 
Earls] put themselves in a position to claim the tax advantage of equal-income separate 
returns."). 
36. See Amy C. Christian, joint and Several Liability and the joint Return: Its Implications for 
Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 546 n.75 (1998); Carolyn]. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of 
Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 124 (2004); Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and 
Family, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1996, 2092 (2003) [hereinafter Developments]. 
37. See infra note 44. 
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Should the couple divorce, the husband's earnings accumulated over the 
course of the marriage would be divided according to equitable distribution 
principles--often leaving the wife with a less than fifty percent share.38 
38. Professor Joan Williams notes an anomaly in the application of the equitable-
distribution principles: 
Statutes typically provide that marital property shall be divided based on each 
spouse's contributions to the marriage; many states include homemaking either by 
statute or ... by case law. Yet, in applying this law, an interesting pattern emerges. 
Typically, courts treat property as jointly owned when dealing with modest estates, 
where splitting the property 50/50 often forces the sale of the family home in 
order to allow the husband to "get his equity out." Yet, where the estate is large, 
courts in Connecticut and elsewhere traditionally use the "he who earns it, owns it" 
rule, reflecting a sense that wives do not "need" half of, say, a billion dollars .... 
This sense is even more explicit in the context of alimony. In ... most ... states, 
wives' entitlement to alimony is explicitly based on need. 
Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wive\' After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REv. 249, 250 
(1999) (citations omitted). 
In the famous 1998 Connecticut case Wendt v. Wendt, corporate star Gary Wendt 
divorced his wife of thirty-one years, leaving her with significantly less than fifty percent of his 
earnings over the course of their marriage. His wife, Lorna, sued, demanding an equal share. 
Mr. Wednt's trial testimony reveals the gulf between the husband's and the wife's perceptions of 
the economic aspects of their marriage. 
[Lorna Wendt's attorney:] "You had no idea [your marriage] was an equal 
partnership with Lorna?" 
[Mr. Wendt:] "I can't ever recall that being discussed or thought about." 
[Attorney:] "You never thought about your marriage as a partnership?" 
[Mr. Wendt:] "In economic terms? No, I didn't." 
[Attorney:] "Did you ever tell her that?" 
[Mr. Wendt:] "No, and she didn't ask." 
[Attorney:] "You didn't think of your marriage as a team effort?" 
[Mr. Wendt:] "No, I didn't .... [I was] totally responsible for all creation and 
value of the assets .... I cannot find anything close to (justifYing] an equal 
distribution ofthese assets." 
[Attorney:] "Is it your view that making money is more important than raising a 
child? ... You have testified that the financial contribution to the marriage was 
almost all yours .... Do you believe that raising children is less important than 
making money?" 
[Mr. Wendt:] "Raising children should not be measured by anywhere near the 
same standard as making money. I don't believe they should be measured in any 
way next to each other; they are two different things." 
ANN CRITIENDON, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 137-38 (2001) (author's commentary omitted). 
Note also that even if equitable-distribution law resulted in a fifty-fifty split after 
marriage, basing income splitting on a future expectation of equal ownership flies in the face of 
our foundational definition of income: realized accessions to wealth over which the taxpayer 
has-not "is likely to have" --complete dominion. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 
426, 431 (1955). Professor Marjorie Kornhauser explains the income-splitting principles of 
equitable-distribution statutes in the following way: 
Common-law equitable distribution statutes do not justifY income-splitting since 
the rights arise only on dissolution of marriage. While the statutes might put 
restraints on management during marriage, these restraints are much too limited 
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In the nine community-property states, earned income acquired in the 
course of the marriage (other than by gift or inheritance) is automatically 
community, i.e., property in which each spouse holds an equal undivided 
interest. Thus, in these states, the non-wage-earning spouse is by default 
entitled to an equal share in the wage earner's income.39 If the husband in 
our example deposits his check in a separate account, the law regards that 
account as jointly owned by him and his wife. That said, in some community-
property states, taxable income from separate property (property acquired 
before the marriage or through gift or devise) is taxable separately. 40 
The current income-splitting rule also misses its mark because spouses 
are free to opt out of the community-property regime.41 Indeed, in most 
states-community or common law-the standards governing pre- and post-
marital agreements have become 42 so relaxed as to render default rules 
regarding marital sharing (already minimal in most states) essentially 
optional. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, promulgated in 1983 
and, as of 2003, adopted by a majority of the states,43 goes so far as to allow 
spouses to opt out of the duty of mutual support/4 so long as doing so does 
not render either party eligible for public assistance.45 
to impose income-splitting when the majority of control of the property still rests 
with the earner. 
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 104 (citations omitted); see also Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 
76 n.l. 
39. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 124-25 ("[T]he basic principle of community 
property is that '[t]he respective interests of the husband and wife ... during continuance of 
the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal interests.' Spouses are thus equal owners of 
all property acquired during marriage, regardless of how the property is nominally titled." 
(quoting CAL. FAM. CODE§ 751 (West 1994)) (other citations omitted)). 
40. See IRS, Internal Revenue Manual, Exhibit 25.18.1-1, Comparisons of State Law 
Differences in Community Property States (Feb. 15, 2005), available at 
http:/ /www.irs.gov/irm/part25/ch13s01.html [hereinafter IRS Manual]. 
41. See id. (indicating that all community-property states recognize pre- or post- marital 
property-characterization agreements); see also BIITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 'II 76.2 ("Most 
community-property states permit a married couple to agree that community property will be 
held in separate ownership .... "). 
42. \Vhen marriage-based income splitting was introduced in 1948, antenuptial 
agreements were regarded as "per se invalid as contrary to the public policy of promoting 
marital stability." Developments, supra note 36, at 2078. 
43. See id. at 2081 n.35; Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern 
Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1542 n.384 (2001) (citing Allison A. Marston, Note, 
Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 899 (1997) ). 
44. The duty of mutual support is today largely symbolic. See Christian, supra note 36, at 
540 n. 75. Christian notes: 
Modern courts tend not to interfere or to enforce the husband's obligation to 
support his wife except in extreme cases, like a husband refusing to pay his wife's 
hospital bill. The support obligation was a creature of common Jaw, especially 
before the advent of the Married Women's Property Acts. Before wives could own 
property of their own, they needed, and the law provided them with, support from 
their husbands. Once wives could own their own property under the Married 
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Even if marriage did create community-property-style legal entitlements, 
the shared-ownership justification does not explain why spouses, who co-own 
each other's income, should be exempt from the assignment of income 
doctrine. Recall that when an individual shares a portion of her income with 
another taxpayer, the transfer must be characterized as gift or 
compensation. Entering into a legal obligation to share income, one that 
gives the recipient binding rights to it, does not in itself transform the 
transfer into a deductible business expense which, arithmetically, is what 
income splitting accomplishes.46 Why then should transfers between spouses 
be blessed with this automatic beneficial treatment? If the assignment of 
income doctrine were applied to married couples, the law would require 
husbands and wives to designate every dollar that passes between them as 
either gift or compensation. Couples who share earnings equally, who have 
decided that the family's income will be earned by one spouse while the 
other cleans, counsels, and carpools, would be forced to allocate the 
earner's fifty percent transfer into categories. As we shall see, the difficulty 
and discomfort that this suggestion raises contain the kernel of what I 
believe is the only rational justification for income splitting, though it does 
not justify income splitting only for spouses to the exclusion of unmarried 
couples legally committed to income sharing. 
Women's Property Acts the support obligation under common law, although not 
ceasing altogether, gradually became less important. ... Not only has the support 
obligation lost importance over time, but it also is "not directly enforceable 
between the parties when married. The support obligation may be enforceable 
during a marriage only by third party creditors who may sue one spouse for certain 
very narrow categories of debts ... undertaken by the other." 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Lave: Housework and the 
Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (1996) ); see also Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household 
Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 183 (1998) ("[L]egal support obligations are very minimal and 
less than adequate to protect the secondary earner's legitimate expectations of benefit from 
marriage." (citation omitted)). 
45. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act provides: 
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support 
and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be 
eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation 
or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may 
require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that 
eligibility. 
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6(b) (1983). 
Note that the prevalence of premarital contracting is unclear. See David E. Rovella, Pre-
Nups No Longer Just for the Wealthy, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 6, 1999, at A1; Aline Sullivan, Kiss Me and 
Sign Here, Darling; Demand for Prenuptial Agreements Is on the Rise, INT'L HERALD TRJB., Feb. 8, 
1997, at 15. See generaUy Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?, (John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 436 (Sept. 2003)), 
available at http:/ /www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ olin_ center /papers/pdf/ 436.pdf. 
46. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
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2. Shared Consumption Justification 
Legal ownership aside, income splitting is sometimes defended as an 
adjustment necessary to account for behavioral patterns of shared 
consumption.47 In other words, since husband and wife normally spend the 
earner spouse's income jointly and benefit from it more or less equally, the 
argument goes, treating the earner as a separate individual for tax purposes 
would be unfair. 
But statistical evidence of marital sharing is subject to much dispute. 
Data on income pooling within couples is scarce,48 is likely to be 
unreliable,49 and has been interpreted as supporting50 as well as debunking51 
the marital unity paradigm. 
47. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1420-22. The Carter Commission recognizes this concept: 
[T]he family is today ... the basic economic unit in society .... [A]s soon as a 
marriage is contracted it is the continued income and financial position of the 
family which is ordinarily of primary concern, not the income and financial position 
of the individual members. Thus, the married couple itself adopts the economic 
concept of the family as the income unit from the outset .... Family income is 
normally budgeted between current and capital outlays, and major decisions 
involving the Iauer are usually made jointly by the spouses. 
See REPORT OF THE [CANADIAN] ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Carter Commission) 122-24 
(1966), cited in Bittker, supra note 29, at 1393 (emphasis added). 
48. See Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabiting and Married Couples' 
Income Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 525, 525 
(2003) ("[C]ouple income organization has not received much empirical attention."); Zelenak, 
supra note 5, at 348 ("There has been remarkably little empirical research into the income-
sharing patterns of married couples."). 
49. As Zelenak put it, "It is extremely difficult to gather reliable information on pooling 
behavior, partly because of the great mass of relevant behavior, partly because of privacy 
concerns, and partly because of the difficulty of interpreting behavior." Zelenak, supra note 5, at 
350. It should also be noted that most studies do not distinguish between unmarried couples 
who choose not to marry and those who want to marry but are not permitted to. 
50. See Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra note 48, at 526 ("[F]or married couples research 
has consistently found that pooling is the preferred arrangement .... 1n contrast to married 
couples, the small body of literature on cohabiting couples indicates that they are more likely to 
keep finances separate .... "); J. Treas, Money in the Bank: Transaction Costs and the Economic 
Organization of Marriage, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 723 (1993), cited in Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra 
note 48, at 526--27 (finding that "two thirds of married couples with a bank account kept joint 
accounts only"); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 498--99 (1995), 
referenced in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 1058 
(2004). Zelenak notes: 
[P]auems of household income and expenditure indicate that most spouses have 
no choice but to share roughly equally in the consumption of their combined 
income .... If one accepts the premise that the crucial question in determining 
the appropriate taxable unit is "Does this person pool his income with another 
person for the purpose of shared consumption (and savings)?" then requiring 
joint returns for married couples and separate returns for unmarried persons is an 
easy-to-administer rule that gets it right most of the time. 
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 353 (citations omitted). 
1524 91 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2006] 
Even if marriage did serve as a reasonable proxy for marital sharing, 
Pamela Gann, Matjorie Kornhauser, and Lawrence Zelenak have 
demonstrated that the shared consumption justification for income splitting 
is inconsistent with the foundational principle that income taxes should be 
based on who controls income rather than who consumes it. 52 
Think, for example, of three young investment bankers-Meg, Malik, 
and Seymour. Each makes $100,000 per year, of which they each owe 
51. See Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income 
Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 380 (1990) ("Shere Hite reports in a study ... 
that seventy-five percent of wives who work are working at least in part for the financial 
independence it brings .... These women clearly do not regard their property as belonging 
equally to their husbands." (citations omitted)); Gann, supra note 5, at 26 n.97 (discussing 
several articles that explore the prevalence of marital sharing); Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 98-
99 Uustifying the taxation of marital couples as a single taxable unit); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing 
Housework, 84 GEO. LJ. 1571, 1594 (1996) ("Most studies indicate ... that Congress's 
assumption that families operate as a single economic unit, sharing income and expenses 
equally, is flawed."); Ventry, supra note 10, at 389 ("Between 1969 and 1995 ... [e]mpirical 
research ... undermined the pooling/sharing argument, finding that in most marriages, 
spouses did not split intra-household allocations of income and wealth." (citations omitted)). 
Even among couples who do purportedly share equally, some scholars believe that 
"[b]ehind the fa<;ade of sharing is a deep-seated, though often subtle, control of the income by 
the earner spouse." Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 91. As one scholar put it, "The bread-winners 
are often the meat-eaters." Michael Young, The Distribution of Income Within the Family, 3 BR.]. 
SOC. 305, 314 (1952), cited in EDWARD LAzEAR & ROBERT MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME 
WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 14-15, cited in Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 80 n.51 ("Young found 
that in British working-class families between World Wars I and II, the male earner gave his wife 
a flat weekly allowance and disposed of the rest of the income as he wished. The wife frequently 
was ignorant of how much he made and how he spent it."); see also EDWARD MCCAFFERY, TAXING 
WOMEN 24 (1997) ("Many surveys and studies indicate that who earns the money matters a 
great deal to the internal dynamics of families."). Also, Amy Ellen Schwartz observes: 
[T]here seems to be mounting evidence that family consumption decisions do 
depend upon the distribution of earnings between the husband and the wife .... 
The implication for tax policy is that while the evidence may not be fully 
conclusive, there is significant evidence that husbands and wives do not ignore the 
source of the income in making economic decisions. That means that it may be 
inappropriate to view them as a single economic unit. 
Amy Ellen Schwartz, Whose Money Is It?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. 135, 137 (1999) (citations 
omitted). 
Sharing among spouses is likely to involve consumed rather than saved income. See 
Gann, supra note 5, at 26 (citing William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 
86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 349 n.69 (1972)) ("(C]ommentators assume that equal sharing is more 
likely in consumption than in savings."); see also Zelenak, supra note 6, at 28 (finding that 
although "the result [of pooled marital income] is technically shared consumption, it may 
[nonetheless] be skewed toward the earner's consumption preferences"). 
52. See Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 105 ("Under traditional income tax principles, control 
typically governs taxation. The mere receipt of a benefit does not cause a person to be taxed."); 
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 354-58; see also Gann, supra note 5, at 25-26 & n.93; Kornhauser, supra 
note 5, at 97 ("(T]he pooling rationale is criticized because it focuses on income consumption, 
which is more appropriate for a consumption-based tax than an income tax that measures 
accessions to wealth." (citations omitted)). 
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approximately $20,00053 in taxes. Meg and Malik fall in love, move in 
together, and decide to get married. Shortly after the wedding, Meg leaves 
her job to fulfill a lifelong dream: becoming a trapeze artist. Malik's 
$100,000 supports both himself and Meg, who now has no income. Despite 
the money they are saving by splitting the rent, their lifestyle is not what it 
used to be. Still, Meg is delighted and when Meg is happy, Malik is too. 
Seymour, who has always dreamed of trying his hand at painting, is still hard 
at work with Malik. Though he is jealous of Meg and wishes it was he who 
had found love and a sugar daddy, he keeps his resentment to himself. But 
come tax time, he loses his cool. It turns out that filing jointly with Meg, 
Malik now owes some $6,00054 less than Seymour on the same $100,000 of 
income. Essentially, the government is subsidizing Meg's new hobby. Put 
another way, the government has handed Malik $6,000 (in form of a tax 
break) for no other reason than being married to someone who has opted 
out of the workforce. Malik's choice to marry, and the pleasure he derives 
from making it possible for Meg to do the double somersault, are personal 
consumption choices that, the argument goes, should have no effect on his 
tax liability. 55 
Another consumption-related argument in favor of income splitting is 
that married breadwinners deserve to pay less in taxes than their single co-
workers because their paycheck supports an additional person. This 
argument does not logically justifY income splitting. First, the satisfaction of 
support obligations often does not produce fifty-fifty joint consumption. 
53. Using 2006 tax rate tables and inflation adjusted figures for the standard deduction, 
each individual taxpayer making $100,000 has a taxable income of $100,000 minus $5,150 (the 
standard deduction), minus $3,300 (the personal exemption), i.e., $91,550. Applying the rate 
table to this amount yields taxes owed of $15,107.50 plus 28% of the excess of $91,550 over 
$74,200, i.e., $19,965.50. 
54. Married taxpayers making $100,000 have a taxable income of $100,000 minus $10,300 
(twice the standard deduction), minus $6,600 (twice the personal exemption), i.e., $83,100. 
Their tax is: $8,180 plus 25% of the excess of$83,100 over $61,300, i.e., $13,890. 
55. This objection to the consumption-based justification for income splitting is prone to 
attack for relying on an outmoded conception of the U.S. income tax system. Though it is true 
that our system is based on realized accretions of wealth, the Internal Revenue Code is riddled 
with provisions that deviate from this ideal. In a perfect accretion system, all outlays that are not 
costs of producing income (i.e., all "personal expenses") would have no effect on the measure 
of taxable income. Though the statute codifies this principle as a general rule, l.R.C. § 262 
(2002), it carves out numerous exceptions to it. For example, interest on a home mortgage, 
I.R.C. § 163(h), interest on student loans, l.R.C. § 221, and charitable contributions, I.R.C. § 
170, are deductible despite their personal nature. 
The primary justification for these exceptions is that they are designed to encourage 
activities that stand to benefit all of society. Congress has identified home-ownership, education, 
and charitable giving as societal goods, the benefits of which outweigh unfairness to taxpayers 
who are unable to use these deductions and who therefore owe taxes on a greater portion of 
their income. Some people feel that this rationale holds equally true for marriage. However, if 
the raison d'etre of marriage-based income splitting is marriage promotion, it represents an 
inefficient means of achieving this goal. See infra Part Il.A.5. 
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Second, even if it did, for the same reasons outlined above, shared 
consumption does not justify income splitting in a system founded on the 
principle that fruits should not be "attributed to a different tree from that 
on which they grew."56 That said, support obligations may well justify a 
reduction in tax liability through dependency exemptions that constitute 
acknowledged public policy-based deviations from the attribution 
. . I s7 pnnCip e. 
3. Collective Efforts Justification 
A third traditional justification for spouses-only income splitting is that 
in addition to changing individuals' control over how they consume or 
invest their income, marriage turns independent economic agents into 
business partners of sorts. Spouses' monetary and non-monetary 
contributions to the marital unit are said to be inextricably linked; income 
nominally earned by either spouse therefore reflects the combined efforts of 
both. From this perspective, a non-wage-earning wife who provides services 
as homemaker, confidante, and companion to business-related events is 
performing one piece of a collective income-producing effort. A wage-
earning husband who splits his income with a non-earner wife is simply 
handing over her fair share of the fruits of their combined labor.58 A tax 
system that permits married couples to income split comports with this 
presumed collective-income-producing reality.59 
56. Lucasv.Ear1,281 U.S.l11, l15 (1930). 
57. For a discussion of the relationship between dependency exemptions and income 
splitting, see infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
58. As one marriage manual published in the 1940s-a time when the logic behind 
income splitting was being hotly debated-put it: 
A salary check is made payable to the husband. For this reason, many men assume 
that they alone earn that salary. If the wife cares for the home, children, and 
husband; is an expert in consumption; makes social contacts that assist the 
husband in his profession or broaden family experience; is a companion who 
enriches his life, stirs his ambitions, aids him in his work, gives him something to 
work for, do they not earn the income jointly? ... She need not feel that she is a 
parasite. She and her husband are partners in an enterprise that includes both her 
work and his as component parts. 
HENRY BOWMAN, MARRIAGE FOR MODERNS 370 (2d ed. 1948), quoted in Jones, supra note 34, at 
281-82 & n.159; see also John L. McClellan, Where You Pay Less Income Tax, AM. MAG., Jan. 1948, 
at 37, quoted in Jones, supra note 34, at 271 & n.85 (noting that Arkansas Senator John L. 
McClellan stated the following regarding community property: "The law says, and most 
husbands will agree, that a wife's mental and physical labor at home is a 50 percent 
contribution and she should be properly paid"). 
59. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1420 ("The rationale [for income splitting] is not only 
that the legal incidents of marital income are divided between the two spouses, but also that 
they both contribute to its realization."); see also Ventry, supra note 10, at 87 ("(C]ommunity 
property law was 'based on the theory that the women at home are keeping the home fires 
going, and that they are actually responsible for the accumulation of part of the property.'" 
(quoting Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
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But this "collective-efforts" justification also contradicts principles 
applicable to unmarried taxpayers; even when taxpayers share income fifty-
fifty, they are not permitted to (effectively) income split unless both are 
equally responsible for the production of income. 
Consider Mr. CEO who earns $800,000 and whose wife has no 
independent income. Wife accompanies Mr. CEO to dinners and 
conferences, advises him on everything from dress to long-term strategy, 
runs the household, and raises their five children. The couple shares all 
income fifty-fifty-meaning that the wife has full rights over $400,000 of the 
husband's $800,000 salary. Is this $400,000 compensation for services? 
Personal or business-related? How much of it is a gift? If a full one-half of the 
husband's income were attributable to the wife's labor, he could hire her, 
pay her one-half of "his" earnings, and deduct the payments as business 
expenses under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, producing the 
d l . 1· . 60 B . h k I 61 same en resu t as mcome sp ItUng. ut m many cases t e mar et va ue 
of the non-earner spouse's labor preformed strictly in the service of the 
earner-spouse's income production (which excludes "private sphere" labor 
like childrearing) is far smaller than one-half of the earner's income. 
According to the logic of the income tax, every one of the $400,000 
transferred by Mr. CEO to his wife is theoretically allocable to one of the 
three categories and should be treated accordingly. But because they are 
married, our couple need not make this calculation; income splitting 
effectively treats transfers that would normally be deemed gifts or payments 
for personal services as if they were business-related compensation, giving 
the couple something that, according to the tax logic applicable to 
individuals, they do not deserve. 
4. Couples Neutrality Justification 
Finally, marriage-based income splitting is frequently defended as a 
means of preserving "couples neutrality." Couples neutrality derives from 
the principle of "horizontal equity," the notion that people in similar 
economic posiUons should be treated similarly for tax purposes. 
Accordingly, couples neutrality requires that as merged economic units, 
couples with the same combined income should owe the same taxes 
Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 137 (1934) (statement of Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., Lousiana 
Community Property Taxpayer's Committee))). 
60. Note that if the husband is not self-employed, the payments to his wife would have to 
be made directly by his employer. Another possibility for achieving the same result would be for 
husband and wife to form a partnership. See Bn-rKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 1 75.2.2. 
61. Market value may of course have no relationship with the value of this labor from a 
vantage point internal to the marriage. Indeed, it may often be regarded as more valuable, as in 
case of a stay-at-home mother who could earn more than her husband in the market place but 
who prioritizes childrearing over income. 
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regardless of the distribution of income between the spouses.62 For example, 
if couples neutrality is preserved, a husband and wife who make $80,000 and 
$20,000 respectively ought to bear the same tax burden as a husband and 
wife who each make $50,000 or a one-earner couple whose breadwinner 
makes $100,000.63 
Couples neutrality is flawed because, again, it relies on the false premise 
that marriage equals economic unity. A one-earner $100,000-a-year couple 
who share everything is in a fundamentally different position than a 
husband and wife with the same income profile who share a negligible 
portion of the earner's income. Leaving aside the assignment of income 
problems discussed above, equalizing treatment of economically united and 
financially independent marital units flies in the face of basic equity 
principles: the non-sharing high earner spouse receives a windfall compared 
with an unmarried co-worker who earns, owns, and consumes the same 
amount.64 
Notwithstanding the false marital unity premise on which it is based, the 
couples neutrality justification is also problematic because, by equalizing 
treatment of couples based on their combined incomes, income-splitting 
exacerbates distortions attributable to the nontaxation of non-wage labor 
performed within the married unit. As a result, the couples neutrality 
justification does not hold with respect to couples who spend different 
amounts of time performing wage labor.65 For example, a one-earner couple 
62. See Gann, supra note 5, at 25; Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 63, 96; Zelenak, supra note 
5, at 344. 
63. As a historical matter, couples neutrality did not play into Congress's 1948 decision to 
extend income splitting to all married couples. Nevertheless, it has taken center stage in after-
the-fact justifications of the joint return. See Zelenak, supra note 6, at 5 ("Despite the 
overwhelming evidence that the original joint return was an accident of history rather than a 
principled enactment of couples neutrality, in the years since 1948 couples neutrality has 
become the standard justification for joint returns."); see also Gann, supra note 5, at 24; Zelenak, 
supra note 6, at 5 n.21. 
64. Recall, for example, Meg and Malik from the scenario above. Meg makes nothing as a 
budding trapeze artist. Malik earns $100,000 per year. Assume this time that Malik is less than 
thrilled at the prospect of becoming the only wage earner in the family. He gives Meg an 
allowance that is enough to cover only her basic needs, but otherwise invests most of his income 
in his own stock portfolio. Tensions mount and they decide, amicably, to take a break. Meg 
moves in with a lion tamer. Still, she remains married to Malik, and they continue filing jointly 
because of the $6,000 taX advantage. 
Since pooling becomes less prevalent as income levels rise, and since the breadwinner 
in one-earner families is usually the husband, the extension of income splitting to economically 
separate spouses is especially beneficial for rich, tight-fisted men. 
65. Boris Bittker has argued that the failure to rax imputed income is a system-wide 
problem, not a unique result of couples neutrality and therefore should not affect debates 
about taxing married taXpayers as a unit. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1426, 1435. However, Edward 
McCaffery has insisted that the distortions attributable to the non taxation of imputed income 
are particularly harmful in the context of comparisons between one-earner and two-earner 
couples. By ignoring the effects of social and legal realities that deter secondary earners from 
entering the labor force, couples neutrality is not neutral as between different models of the 
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in which the non-earning spouse contributes household and childcare 
services to the marital unit is better off than a two-earner couple that hires a 
maid and a babysitter. If both couples' combined incomes are $100,000, the 
one-earner couple gets to keep more of this income because the non-earner 
spouse has essentially added to the couple's disposable income by making it 
unnecessary for them to pay for these services, while the two-earner couple 
will not be allowed to deduct these services as a business expense. The fact 
that our system does not tax this additional "imputed income"66 and treats 
all married couples with the same combined income equally, gives one-
earner couples a significant advantage over two-earners. 
5. Note Regarding Marriage Promotion Initiatives 
Most tax policy scholars believe that absent compelling public policy 
reasons to the contrary, tax law should interfere as little as possible with 
people's behavior. Accordingly, over the years most critics have regarded the 
marriage bonus created by income splitting as an undesirable but tolerable 
side effect of the law's attempt to accommodate competing principles. 57 The 
justifications presented above may be understood as attempts to excuse an 
aspect of income splitting regarded as a defect. But outside of academia, the 
principle of marriage neutrality is not necessarily taken for granted. Some 
people believe that the government should actively promote marriage, and 
that the benefits of marriage-based income splitting present an appropriate 
means of doing so. Though Congress did not create the "marriage bonus" as 
a marriage-promotion vehicle, many politicians and their constituents have 
grown to view it and defend it as such. President George W. Bush, for 
example, whose "marriage penalty relief' plan increased marriage bonuses,68 
has said: "I like to remind people that the tax code ought to encourage 
marriage, not discourage marriage .... Seems like we want people to stay 
married, and the tax code ought to encourage that."69 
family. McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1009-10 ("[W]e are exalting single-earner households over 
all competing visions."). Lawrence Zelenak agrees that the imputed-income problem 
"undercut[s] the argument that joint returns achieve neutrality among equal-income couples." 
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 363; see also Gann, supra note 5, at 8, 30. 
Note, however, that the imputed-income problem in this context could be addressed 
by reinstituting the two-earner deduction. 
66. For a discussion of the reasons for the nontaxation of household labor-"difficulties 
with valuation, liquidity, and commodification"-see Staudt, supra note 51, at 1577-79. Staudt 
critiques this conventional wisdom, suggesting that Congress values and taxes nonmarket labor 
in the same manner as market labor. Id. at 1574. 
67. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1395 ("[G]iven a progressive rate schedule, a marriage-
neutral tax system cannot be reconciled with a regime of equal taxes for equal-income married 
couples."). 
68. See Appendix. 
69. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Economy, Urges Congress to Make Tax 
Cuts Permanent (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2004/02/20040219-4.html. On another occasion, the President declared that "[w]e 
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Government-sponsored marriage-promotion mttiatives are extremely 
controversial/0 but even if one accepts the premise that "the tax code ought 
to encourage marriage," marriage-based income splitting presents a 
remarkably inefficient means of doing so because its benefits are unlikely to 
reach its main target population. The main beneficiaries of the marriage 
bonus are high-income couples. But one of the pillars of the marriage-
promotion philosophy is that government incentives for marriage are 
justified because marriage functions as a panacea to poverty. 71 It follows that 
those who are arguably most acutely in need of the palliative effects of 
marriage are those least likely to benefit from marriage bonuses and 
therefore least likely to be induced to marry because of them. 
Furthermore, marriage-promotion advocates generally do not support 
an "anything goes" interpretation of marriage. In fact, the assumption that 
marriage should be a partnership of equals, not a subordination 
relationship, hovers in the background of several "pro-marriage" writings. As 
Family Research Council senior fellow Charmaine Yoest put it in a piece 
arguing for a return to 1948-style "pure income splitting,"72 "When 
conservatives cast income splitting as a path to full partnership for women, 
they are invoking ideals shared by feminists." 73 Since civil marriage does not 
want to reward and honor marriage." President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to 
the Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www. whitehouse.gov I news/ releases/2003/ 10/20031 009-15.html. 
According to this view, Malik's decision to legally commit to Meg should be 
encouraged and rewarded; the societal benefits that accrue from turning unmarried couples 
into spouses are well worth the resulting unfairness to singles like Seymour. 
70. See Theodora Ooms, The Rnle of the Federal Government in Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA. J. 
Soc. POL'Y & L. 163, 175-76 (2001); Katherine Boo, The Marriage Cure, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 
18, 2003, at 105. 
71. See LINDA]. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CAsE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED 
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 172 (2000); Ooms, supra note 
70, at 183-85; Boo, supra note 70, at 105. 
72. For a discussion of pure income splitting, see the Appendix. 
73. Charmaine Yoest, Income Splitting: Resturing Marriage Support in the Tax Code, 1 FAM. 
POL'Y REV. 37, 57 (2003); see also WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 172. Waite and 
Gallagher query: 
[I]s the full-time employment of wives in a high-earning job ... the only route to a 
"fair" marriage? Can we have equal marriages with an employed father and a 
mother who works only in the home or works part-time? Steven Nock argues that 
coercion and inequity, not dependency, lie at the heart of the problems of 
traditional marriage. Dependency is not the enemy. In fact, marriage gets much of 
its power from the interdependency that allows each spouse to specialize. Marriage 
works best when husbands and wives need each other. But to achieve this 
alternative vision of the new family, dependencies must be freely chosen, not 
coerced. Both partners need to be protected against the risks inherent in even 
freely chosen dependency. And husband and wife must recognize themselves both 
as dependents in their joint project, the family-even if they have very different 
incomes or one has no income at all for a period. This recognition of marriage as 
true partnership, an interdependent relationship rather than one of domination 
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necessarily translate into a serious legal and financial commitment, 
government programs that privilege even the most tenuous of marriages 
may do more harm than good to conservative efforts to "revitalize" marriage. 
That said, as we shall see in Part III, Americans' ideal of marriage as a 
financial partnership does explain the persistence of the income-splitting 
joint return; it also points the way towards a more logical approach to 
income splitting. 
B. NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE-BASED INCOME SPUTTING 
1. The Marriage Penalty 
The. current system of marriage-based joint returns is not only 
theoretically unsound. It also produces a host of negative side effects, the 
most well-known of which is the much-maligned "marriage penalty"-the 
fact that some couples owe more in taxes once they are married than they 
would have owed had they remained single. The penalty disadvantages 
married couples who are in the same economic position as their unmarried 
counterparts, and it may interfere with couples' decisions to marry or 
divorce.74 
The penalty represents an unintended side effect of Congress's effort to 
reduce the size of the marriage bonus that resulted from its first experiment 
with income splitting. The 1948 Revenue Act introduced what is known as 
"pure income splitting"-spouses filing jointly paid exactly what they would 
have paid had each spouse earned one-half of the combined income of the 
couple as separate individuals (the married-filingjointly brackets were twice 
as wide as those applicable to individuals). This meant that some taxpayers 
enjoyed a tax savings of some forty percent as a result of being married.75 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 lessened the bonus by narrowing the tax 
brackets for married couples. As a result, the tax due on a married couple's 
combined income was somewhat greater than twice the amount owed by a 
single taxpayer earning half as much. That is, pure income splitting gave way 
to a scaled-back version of income splitting. This had the effect of reducing 
the marriage bonus (enjoyed by one-earner couples and couples with 
unequal incomes), but it also created a penalty for couples with equal 
incomes, who now paid more as marrieds than they would as singles. The 
and subordination, has implications outside the home as well, affecting ... how we 
treat married couples in the tax code as well as the divorce court. 
/d. (citations omitted). 
74. See generally James Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or Money? The Impact of Income 
Taxes on Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297 ( 1999), quoted in George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: 
Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 423 n.21 (2004). 
75. MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX 31-32 (1999). 
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2001 Act reduced the penalty by reverting to pure income splitting, but only 
at low-income levels. The change also increased marriage bonuses. 76 
2. The Innocent-Spouse Problem 
The current income-splitting paradigm also potentially imposes an 
unfair liability on low- and non-earner spouses who have no legal 
entitlement to the income on which they are taxed (the "innocent spouse" 
problem). In order to take advantage of the benefits of income splitting, the 
high-earning taxpayer must file a joint return with his or her spouse, making 
both spouses jointly and severally liable for any taxes due on the return 
(including deficiencies that may emerge years later and regardless of 
whether the couple stays married) .77 Every year, taxpayers abandoned by tax-
cheating spouses find themselves owing thousands of dollars to the IRS. The 
. . fth 78 vast maJonty o em are women. 
The joint-liability rule is sometimes erroneously defended as the price 
married taxpayers must pay for the benefits of income splitting. 79 But the 
logic of this justification only holds if income splitting for tax purposes were 
contingent upon income splitting as a matter of actual legal entitlements. As 
we have seen, income splitting for tax purposes does not require that 
couples share legal entitlement to income. Neither does filing a joint return 
76. See the Appendix for an explanation. 
77. See generally BIITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 'II 111.3.2. 
78. See Charles Delafuente, Your Taxes: My Spouse Did What on Our Federal Tax Return?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, § 3, at 33. Delafuente reports: 
At the root of an innocent spouse claim, there is typically an I.R.S. finding that 
income has been underreported or that deductions or credits have been 
overstated. In such situations, the I.R.S. demands more tax; often, the I.R.S. tries to 
collect it from the spouse with easier-to-find income, like salary. That person-
most commonly a wife, according to tax professionals-may file for innocent-
spouse status. 
/d. The article goes on to report CCH tax analyst Mark Luscombe as saying that some seventy-
five percent of the court cases he has looked at involved women seeking relief. /d.; see also 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 29, at 422; Beck, supra note 51, at 320 n.4 (noting that 
over ninety percent of the reported innocent spouse cases in 1987 involved wives who were 
forced to pay their husbands' taxes). 
79. In fact, joint return liability was enacted on the basis of administrative necessity, and it 
applies to all taxpayers filing joint returns, whether or not they benefit from income splitting. 
See Beck, supra note 51, Parts IV.F, VI.A. 
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"effect a conveyance of the earnings from one spouse to the other for 
ownership purposes."80 As a result, as Richard Beck explains: 
The cost of joint liability usually is paid by the wrong person. The 
husband ordinarily benefits most (or exclusively ... ) from income 
splitting as the higher or sole earner, but it is the wife who incurs 
the larger additional liability for his taxes. She may herself receive 
little or no benefit from the tax saving, unless one makes the 
assumption that reducing the husband's taxes always directly 
benefits the wife.81 
The root cause of the innocent-spouse problem-the prevalence of 
spousal abandonment-of course has nothing to do with taxes. However, 
the current tax system exacerbates dependent spouses' vulnerability by 
making them liable for taxes on income they never earned and never 
owned. Under certain circumstances, innocent spouses may be relieved of 
their tax liability, but the numerous restrictions contained in the Code's 
innocent spouse relief provisions still force many low- and non-earning 
spouses, mostly abandoned wives, to shoulder their husbands' debt.82 
The current system also hurts "innocent spouses" by reinforcing the 
fairytale that spouses are an economic unit. Many people are likely unaware 
that in most states the default rule is that spouses own their income 
separately and that divorce often does not result in a fifty-fifty split of assets. 
It would not be unreasonable for a non-earner spouse signing a joint return 
to associate joint-tax liability with joint ownership of the income that 
generated the liability.83 
80. Christian, supra note 36, at 586 & n.253. As Richard Beck put it: 
Aggregating income and deductions for purposes of computing the tax neither 
requires nor creates any actual sharing of property. Couples are permitted to file 
jointly even under circumstances in which it is obvious that they have no intention 
of sharing anything. There is no requirement, for example, that a couple even be 
living together in order to file a joint return. 
Beck, supra note 51, at 378 (citations omitted). 
81. Beck, supra note 51, at 376 (citations omitted). 
82. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, , 111.3.2 (detailing the new innocent spouse 
relief requirements set out by Section 6015); see also Delafuente, supra note 78, § 3, at 33 
(reporting that an I.R.S. spokesman said that "in fiscal year 2004, there were 51,988 applications 
for innocent-spouse relief, and that 9, 788 were granted and an additional 3,804 partially 
granted"); Tom Herman, IRS Makes It Tougher for Spouses to Claim Innocence in Tax Fraud, WALL 
ST.j., Mar. 15, 2006, at Dl. Delafuente also notes that "[q]ualif)'ing as an innocent spouse is no 
simple matter ... for people who are still married, [and] the law can be a minefield." 
Delafuente, supra note 78, § 3, at 33. For a recent proposal limiting lower income spouses' 
liability, see TAXPAYERADVOC'ATE SERV., supra note 29, at 407-32. 
83. According to the Taxpayer Advocate Service: 
Many married taxpayers are probably unaware that they may avoid joint and 
several liability by filing separately. Form 1040 ... does not warn taxpayers that 
filing a joint return will result in joint liability. Although the Form 1040 instruction 
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3. The Stacking Effect-Disincentive for "Secondary Earners" 
to Enter Paid Workforce 
[2006] 
The current income-splitting joint return also creates a disincentive for 
"secondary earners" (taxpayers whose earning potential is low relative to 
their spouses') to enter the paid workforce because their earnings would be 
taxed at prohibitively high marginal rates. When couples file jointly, the low-
earner's income must be "stacked" on top of the high-earner's income, 
subjecting it to taxes at the highest marginal rate applicable to the couple's 
combined income. In some cases this makes it more expensive for the 
spouse with the lower earning potential to work for a salary than to stay at 
home, providing untaxed non-wage labor that the couple would otherwise 
pay for with after-tax dollars. This "stacking effect" has been seen as a 
penalty on working wives because women are more likely to be cast as 
secondary earners. 84 
4. Marital Status Discrimination 
Finally, marriage-based income splitting discriminates against 
unmarried couples, some of whom are indistinguishable from married 
couples in terms of their economic, emotional, and legal commitments to 
each other. While most public attention regarding marital status 
discrimination has focused on same-sex couples who are not able to marry 
or whose marriages are not recognized under federallaw,85 many committed 
booklet discloses that joint filing may subject a taxpayer to JOint and several 
liability, it offers a "tip," that taxpayers should "chose the one [filing status] that 
will give you the lowest tax." Of course, taxpayers who have delegated responsibility 
for family tax preparation to a spouse are unlikely to read the instruction booklet. 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 29, at 24 (citations omitted). 
84. As McCaffery explains: 
[T)he rate structure encourages families to think in terms of a primary and a 
secondary worker, because there is one rate schedule applied to couples .... There 
are strong disincentives against second earners working in the paid workforce at 
all, because they enter it at high marginal rates. Since wives 
are overwhelmingly likely to be the secondary earner in potential two-earner 
families ... this burden falls on women. 
MCCAFFERY, supra note 51, at 19-20. 
It is worth noting that the stacking effect is sometimes mistakenly described as a 
symptom of the marriage penalty. In fact, it is an outcome of the joint-filer system. See Zelenak, 
supra note 6, at 20. 
85. See Ginia Bellafante, Two Fathers, with One Happy to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2004, at A3; Howard D. Medwed, 'Lawrence' Has Little f-jfect on Taxes, for Now; The Defense of 
Marriage Act Prevents Same-Sex Couples from Enjoying Many Fecleral Law Perks, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 1, 
2004, at 15 ("Same-sex households typically function as a single economic unit in much the 
same way as traditional spousal relationships."). Note also that model "living together" 
contracts, many of which formalize property sharing arrangements, abound. See, e.g., TONI 
IHARA ET AL, LIVING TOGETHER: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 6/10 (11th ed. 
2001). 
ANEW"IDO" 1535 
heterosexual couples choose not to marry for a variety of religious, cultural, 
and economic reasons, including potential loss of Social Security benefits. 86 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR INCOME SPLITTING RECONSIDERED 
A. SPOUSES LABORING BY AND FOR THE MARITAL UNIT 
1. Separate Filing Is Not a Realistic Alternative 
The theoretical and practical problems outlined in Part II have led 
many critics to propose replacing joint filing with a separate-filing regime.87 
In a single-filer system each wage earner would be liable for taxes on her 
individual income, regardless of marital status and regardless of whether she 
chooses to share her income with a partner. Separate filing would overcome 
all of the problems outlined above. 
But separate filing is not a realistic option for short-term reform.88 
Americans generally believe that couples deserve special treatment,89 and 
every federal income tax bill adopted since 1948 has preserved income 
86. See generally DORIAN SOLOT & MARsHALL MILLER, UNMARRIED TO EACH OTHER: THE 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LIVING TOGETHER AS AN UNMARRIED COUPLE (2002); Michael j. Brien et 
a!., Widows Waiting to Wed? (Re)Marriage and Economic Incentives in Social Security Widow Benefits, 39 
j. HUM. RESOURCES 585 (2004). 
87. See Alicia Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal Income Tax, 
in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247-78 (Henry j. Aaron & Michael]. Boskin eds., 1980); Bruce 
Bartlett, Recent Proposals Relating to Family Taxation, 91 TAX NOTES 153, 154 n.6 (2001) (citing 
Laura Ann Davis, A Feminist justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 197 (1988)). See generally Gann, supra note 5; Kornhauser, supra note 5; McCaffery, supra 
note 5; Harvey Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX]. 423 (1970); Zelenak, 
supra note 5. 
88. See Zelenak, supra note 6, at 2-3 ("Although mandatory separate returns for all 
taxpayers would eliminate all marriage penalties (and all marriage bonuses), that does not seem 
to be a political possibility in the near future."); see also Bartlett, supra note 87, at 154 ("[T]he 
sensible thing to do would be to adopt a system in which the individual, rather than the family, 
is the basic unit of taxation .... Of course, a major consequence of this would be to eliminate 
existing marriage bonuses from the tax code. This is never going to happen .... " (citations 
omitted)). 
89. Even some of those dedicated to fighting marital status discrimination often punt on 
the conflict of interests between "solo singles'" (i.e., unpartnered singles) and unmarried 
couples' interests. Logically speaking, solo singles should oppose all benefits contingent on any 
relationship between two able-bodied adults (what Martha Fineman calls "horizontal 
relationships")-marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union. See infra note 106. Support 
relationships between earners and those unable to provide for themselves are a different 
matter. I d. But some singles advocates back into the argument that any reforms that chip away 
at marital status discrimination are better than nothing. See Unmarried America, supra note 7. 
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splitting m some form or another.90 The current system and all politically 
realistic proposals to reform it embody the notion that spouses deserve to be 
treated as merged economic units for tax purposes through some form of 
joint filing, the results of which approximate income splitting.91 
Why are we as a society so attached to income splitting and how might 
the cultural underpinnings of joint filing guide our efforts to reform the 
current system? One reason for popular support for retaining the basic 
elements of the current joint return is that once income splitting was 
extended to all married couples, removing it came to be perceived as a tax 
hike on married couples.92 
Separate filing is also unacceptable for reasons that go beyond loss 
aversion. Ignoring marital status and treating spouses in accordance with the 
rules applicable to unrelated taxpayers would, at least theoretically, force 
couples to commodify the flow of goods and services within the relationship. 
90. Dennis Ventry suggests that the longevity of the income-splitting joint return may be 
understood in light of "[t]he path dependent nature of tax policymaking." Ventry, supra note 
10, at 15. Furthermore, Ventry notes: 
[C]hoices made in 1948 created a group of taxpayers that jealously guarded its tax 
benefits. While society evolved in the latter half [sic] the twentieth century, this 
group resisted change. Even as tax experts criticized the joint return for 
contributing to marriage penalties, work disincentives, and other tax inequities, 
policymakers preferred extending favorable tax treatment to new groups of 
taxpayers rather than to taking away existing tax benefits. 
!d.; see also id. at 352 (noting Senator Eugene McCarthy's observation that "[i]t was 
'unrealistic' ... 'to require married couples to give up income splitting [because] (t]he practice 
is too deeply embedded in the system'" (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 22,859 (1969)) ). 
91. Ventry notes that policymakers responsible for the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act: 
[A]dhered to the longstanding allegiance to joint filing and income splitting. So 
long as individual filing remained absent from the policy agenda, no amount of 
piecemeal marriage penalty relief would eliminate the problem. Experts roundly 
criticized joint filing for reflecting and reinforcing a bygone era where men 
worked and women stayed home. Many experts acquiesced to the broad political 
support for joint filing, however, and endorsed incremental reforms. A few 
experts, particularly feminist legal scholars, persisted in advocating the abolition of 
the joint return. But they failed to generate support beyond a small circle of like-
minded experts. Beginning in the mid-1990s, conservatives appeared prepared to 
join feminists and liberals in a campaign against joint filing. Conservatives attacked 
marriage tax penalties for undermining the institution of marriage, encouraging 
divorce, and threatening the American family. But once conservatives realized that 
removing marriage tax penalties also meant removing barriers to work for married 
women, they opted for more moderate forms of marriage penalty relief. 
Institutional constraints reinforced social fears. Neither the [P]resident nor 
Congressional leaders advocated abolishing the joint return, recoiling at the 
prospect of having to create losers in the tax policymaking game. Rather than take 
away marriage tax bonuses, policymakers preserved and extended the bounty. 
!d. at 387-88 (citations omitted). 
92. See supra note 84. 
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In other words, separate filing strictly applied would require transfers that 
are neither purely altruistic nor pure bargained-for exchanges to be 
characterized as either gifts or compensation.93 Applying such a requirement 
to couples that share all income would impose administrative and psychic 
burdens that as a society we would rather avoid.94 This is especially true with 
respect to couples that share support obligations (like parents or co-
guardians) because it is especially hard and, some commentators argue, 
undesirable to force couples to place a dollar value on the non-wage labor of 
primary caregivers, most of whom are women.95 
Consider, for example, a best-selling science fiction author married to a 
chess master turned stay-at-home mother who, on occasion, helps him 
brainstorm about his plots. In a single-filer world, the husband would hire 
his wife as a research assistant and pay her a portion of his royalties as 
compensation, producing a business deduction for him and taxable income 
for her, thereby shifting high-bracket income to a lower bracket. Assuming 
the couple shares all of the husband's income, the question then would be 
how much of the fifty percent of the husband's earnings transferred to the 
wife may be categorized as a business expense. In other words, how much is 
wife-as-sounding board worth? How should her ideas be valued? If the 
93. For a discussion of the difficulty in classifYing transfers between intimate parmers into 
categories applicable to unrelated parties, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 
119 HARV. L. REv. 492, 493 (2005) ("Economic exchange between intimates ... involves 
bargaining as well as altruism."). Hasday proposes a new term, "structured altruism," to describe 
transfers that are neither pure gift nor pure quid pro quo exchange as a category onto itself. !d. 
Hasday posits: 
[T]he social exchange of economic assets between intimates often assumes the 
form of what one could term structured altruism. A classic definition of altruism 
might be that it is a spontaneous act done selflessly for the welfare of another. 
Structured altruism, however, is neither entirely spontaneous nor entirely selfless. 
Anthropologists have discovered that many economic assets are exchanged 
between intimates in the form of gifts. This practice of gift exchange, though, 
involves at least implicit bargaining and self-interest in addition to altruism. 
!d. at 497. 
94. See Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried 
Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1240, 1247 (1980) (stating that "the application of marketplace 
notions to quasi-familial transactions for which such notions are often singularly inappropriate" 
yields "absurd" results); see also ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
INTIMATE LIFE 104-18 (2003) (discussing a wide array of cultural understandings regarding 
interspousal gifts); Cain, supra note 20, at 101 (calling the application of arms length 
transactional principles to spousal transfers the "'fallacy of individualism'"); Zelenak, supra note 
5, at 381-94 (discussing allocation problems in designing a separate-return system). 
95. As Elizabeth Anderson put it, "When women's labor is treated as a commodity, the 
women who perform it are degraded." Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 75 (1990), quoted in Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's 
Household Labor, 9 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 81, 85 & n.l6 (1997); see also Staudt, supra note 51, at 
1633 ("Feminist commentators ... are concerned that valuing ... household labor would 
commodity and demean women ... ."). On commodification, see generally Margaret Jane 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
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couple is truly one economic unit, they will want to put as high a value as 
possible on her business-related contributions because these translate into a 
tax savings. The value of the wife's cooking, cleaning, and childcare services 
performed for the husband, on the other hand, produce a tax hit; the 
husband's "payments" for these are not deductible from his income but 
must be included in hers, meaning that as a couple, our husband and wife 
would be paying taxes twice on the same income. Logically then, they will 
want to minimize their valuation of the stay-at-home-wife's housework. What 
are the social consequences of setting up this type of incentive structure? Do 
we really want spouses who view each other as equal partners to put a dollar 
value on their mutual contributions? Do we want a regime in which spouses 
have to justify the way in which they characterize their contributions to the 
taxing authorities? 
2. Quasi-Separate Filing Is Inconsistent with Society's View of Marriage 
The commodification problem inherent in a pure separate-filing 
regime could be cured through a hybrid separate/joint-filing system taxing 
each individual separately but disregarding transfers between spouses that 
would normally be classified as compensation. This is essentially the de facto 
situation with many unequal-earner same-sex partners who pool income.96 
The Service usually turns a blind eye to these arrangements, rarely requiring 
the low-earning partner who assumes more responsibility for household 
chores to report as compensation income received from the primary wage-
earner, even where technically it would not fall under the Duberstein 
"detached and disinterested generosity" test. This was also the manner in 
which the Service treated married couples in noncommunity property states 
prior to 1948.97 
One way of construing this quasi-separate filer system is by viewing both 
spouses' contributions-the low- or non-earner's household labor and the 
primary earner's income production-as pure reciprocal gifts rather than 
bargained-for exchanges.98 According to this theory, the altruistic house-
husband would continue mopping the floor even if his career-wife stopped 
96. In some instances-when the high-earner provides over fifty percent of the low-
earner's support, the partners live together, and the low earner's income falls below a certain 
threshold amount-the high earner may claim the low-earner as a dependant. I.R.C. § 152 
(2000). 
97. The Lucas opinion, for example, framed the issue as whether the income earner, Guy 
Earl, would be required to report as income his full salary as opposed to declaring only half of it 
on his own return and including the other half on his wife Ella's. The court did not entertain 
the possibility of requiring Guy to report one hundred percent of his income and Ella to report 
again some portion of the same income attributable to payments from husband to wife for her 
domestic labor or companionship. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930). 
98. As gifts they would therefore be exempt from income taxation. See supra text 
accompanying notes 20-21. 
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sharing her income with him and the wife would continue sharing her 
income even if the husband refused to clean the house. 
This interpretation does not sit well with the partnership ideal of 
marriage to which we as a culture aspire. It also weakens non-earner spouses 
by implying that nobody owes anybody anything.99 This is not how most 
people view marriage. We are uncomfortable thinking of stay-at-home 
husbands and wives as beneficiaries of their spouses' bounty, of their interest 
in the wage earners' incomes as dependent on something as uncertain and 
optional as his or her disinterested generosity. Similarly, we think of non-
earners' contributions not merely as something they do out of the goodness 
of their hearts, but rather as a critical piece of couples' cooperative life 
plans. Marriage is often regarded as a contract, the terms of which are the 
subject of an ongoing process negotiation-not entirely at arm's length but 
not entirely with one hundred percent unity of interest either. 
Another way of making sense of the quasi-separate filing approach is to 
regard non-earner spouses' household and childcare labor as "imputed 
• "
100 G II . d . c d . d d mcome. enera y, Impute mcome re~ers to goo s or services pro uce 
by and for the taxpayer herself. Imputed income should be part of the tax 
base because it represents an increase in taxpayers' net worth. For example, 
the single taxpayer is better off when she mops her own house rather than 
paying a housekeeper out of after-tax dollars. The current tax system, 
however, disregards this increase by excluding imputed income from the tax 
base.101 In the case of married taxpayers, when a wife mops the house that 
belongs to her and her wage-earning husband, strictly speaking, only half of 
her labor is imputed income; the other half is services performed for 
someone else (either as a gift or a quid pro quo service). But under the 
quasi-separate filing approach, a wife's household labor may be considered 
"by and for" both spouses. That is, they may be considered one unit with 
respect to her non-wage labor, but two units with respect to his wage labor, 
on which he pays taxes separately (transfers from husband to wife would 
again be construed as nontaxable gifts). 
This asymmetrical imputed income/gift interpretation is even more 
jarring than the reciprocal gifts interpretation. If a wife's household labor is 
by and for the marital unit, a husband's wage labor should be construed with 
the same unitary approach. 
99. See Hasday, supra note 93, at 517 ("[L]egal efforts to mark the specialness of intimate 
relationships by limiting or prohibiting economic exchange within them appear to have 
systematically adverse distributional consequences for women and poorer people, maintaining 
and increasing distributive inequality."). 
100. See MICHAEL j. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 125 (5th ed. 2005) ("Domestic services rendered by homemakers to 
their families is [sic] the largest source of imputed income from seiVices."). 
101. For a discussion of the reasons for the exclusion of imputed income from the tax base, 
see BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 'll 5.3. 
1540 91 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2006] 
3. The True Explanation for Income Splitting: 
Spouses Laboring by and for the Marital Unit 
This brings us to the most compelling and internally consistent 
justification-or,' to be precise,· the true cultural explanation-for income 
splitting. When husbands and wives share income, we are most comfortable 
viewing each spouse's efforts as "by and for" the marital unit. The nonearner 
cleans the family house for both spouses and the earner works outside of the 
home for the family unit. Their sharing is not detached and disinterested, 
but it is also not a marketplace exchange of cash for services. Income 
splitting avoids the commodification problem because each spouse is 
assumed to have earned fifty percent of the income of the couple regardless 
of the nominal distribution of wage- and non-wage-income; unlike quasi-
separate filing, income splitting comports with a narrative of marital 
cooperation and unity that appeals to us culturally.102 
Note that there is a subtle difference between this theory and the 
collective efforts justification discussed in Part II above. Under the collective 
efforts justification, a portion of the earner husband's paycheck belongs to 
his wife because by taking care of his personal needs, she has made it 
possible for him to earn more. Under the "by and for the couple" 
justification, the earner's check belongs to both spouses because the earner 
is both spouses. 103 This is of course a fiction, but no less so than a 
characterization of marital sharing as reciprocal gift giving or a 
compensation arrangement. 
To sum up, spouses-only income splitting can be viewed as the price we 
are willing to pay to live in a society in which husbands and wives do not 
have to keep accounts of what passes between them and in which each 
spouse's labor is regarded as "by and for" the couple. Income splitting is the 
mechanism through which we enable and preserve the 
noncommodification104 of labor and love within the marital unit, matching 
102. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 81-85. 
103. The "by and for the couple" justification is, however, in harmony with what scholars 
have seen as a set of background cultural assumptions reinforcing the formal justifications for 
marriage-based distinctions. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 
101 W.VA. L. REv. 129, 161 (1998). Knauer observes: 
/d. 
The marital provisions are based on a series of assumptions concerning the terms, 
merit, and nature of the taxpayer's relationship with his or her spouse. These 
provisions use marital status to identity (i) a relationship where income or resource 
pooling occurs (or should occur), (ii) a relationship that is worthy of societal 
support in the form of tax deferral or other relief, and (iii) a relationship where 
the individuals never deal with one another at arm's length. 
104. Note that the context in which this Article discusses "noncommodification" -referring 
solely to intramarital transfers-should be distinguished from the noncommodification of 
household labor when viewed from outside the marital unit, which commentators like Staudt 
and Silbaugh persuasively argue results in undervaluation of women's work. See generally 
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the tax treatment of marriage to society's idealized notion of what marriage 
should be. Income splitting is incompatible with an accessions-based 
definition of income 105 because it effectively treats gifts and compensation 
for personal services as if they were compensation for business-related 
services. But from a cultural perspective, income splitting recognizes an 
ideal that is critically important to us. 106 
The social values that undergird the income-splitting joint return, 
however, are inconsistent with its extension to economically separate 
spouses and with its exclusion of unmarried couples that share their income. 
B. PRACTICAL lMPLICA TIONS OF THE "BY AND FOR THE UNIT"jUSTIFICA TION: 
MARRIAGE NEUTRAL ECONOMIC UNITY-BASED INCOME SPLITTING 
1. Excluding Economically Separate Spouses 
The by-and-for-the-couple justification only makes sense with respect to 
couples that do not themselves commodify exchanges within their 
relationship, i.e., couples that do in fact earn and own107 their income as a 
unit. Mter all, if the government is going to award hundreds, sometimes 
thousands of dollars in benefits so that couples can form a certain type of 
union, it is only fair that these benefits be limited to couples who do in fact 
form this special union. Husbands and wives who lead independent financial 
lives do not fit this model; they are separate economic units and should be 
treated as such. 
Also, spouses committed to sharing only part of their earnings should 
not be eligible to income split, nor should they be allowed, as Henry Smith 
has suggested, to partially split their taxable income on the basis of an 
Silbaugh, supra note 95; Staudt, supra note 51. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, the 
noncommodification element of my proposed justification for income splitting elevates the 
value of non-wage labor within the marriage. By paying couples a marriage bonus for forming 
one economic unit, income splitting based on income sharing implies an equivalence in the 
value of spouses' labor. 
105. See supra note I3 and accompanying text. 
106. Income splitting may also be popular for economic reasons, because many believe that 
marriage functions as a giant buddy system, a national insurance policy of sorts that reduces the 
likelihood that the government will be called upon to provide social services to the needy. See, 
e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (noting that civil 
marriage "ensures that children and adults are cared for and supported whenever possible from 
private rather than public funds"). Note, however, that commentators like Martha Fineman 
believe that government should not shift its responsibility to provide a social safety net onto 
private individuals. Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, in JUST MARRIAGE 46, 47 (Mary 
Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004). See generally Duggan, supra note 7. 
107. Though fine distinctions may be made berween couples that "share" versus those that 
"pool" their income, these distinctions are not dispositive for the purposes of this Article. What 
matters, as I discuss in Part IV.A., is that the couple shares legal entitlement to the income as 
they do in the community property model. Thus "sharing" and "pooling" are used 
interchangeably to refer to joint ownership over income. 
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individually determined unequal sharing ratio. 108 This is because the very 
reason we allow income splitting, which represents a radical deviation from 
the logic of the assignment of income doctrine, is because we recognize that 
there is something fundamentally special about two people who have tied 
their financial fates to one another that makes it artificial and potentially 
harmful to force transfers between them into categories applicable to truly 
independent taxpayers. In these cases, analyzing intra-marital transfers using 
tools applicable to unrelated parties makes no sense. Indeed, referring to 
sharing between spouses who co-own each other's income from its very 
inception as a "transfer" is misleading. They are simply one person; the 
notion of exchange, the attempt to allocate "transfers" into 
gift/ compensation categories, is antithetical to the nature of their 
relationship. By contrast, spouses who share some but not all of their income 
have already introduced marketplace principles of exchange into their 
relationship. Indeed, Smith's intermediate joint filing would give social 
legitimacy to unequal partnerships, potentially weakening already powerless 
low- and non-earner spouses. 109 Unequal partnerships do not constitute one 
economic being; therefore, there is no reason to exempt them from 
allocating transfers for tax purposes among the three categories. Income 
splitting persists because we believe that equality within couples is special. 
Spouses who choose inequality-for whatever reason-should be regarded 
108. See Smith, supra note 44, at 146. 
109. Frantz and Dagan state: 
People may engage in many joint enterprises where equality is not necessary. Joint 
owners in a business, for instance, may divide the ownership interest 70-30 without 
raising any alarm. But it would be peiVerse to conceive of a marriage of this sort, 
where one spouse has a recognized controlling interest in the property that 
partially constitutes the marriage, and, correspondingly, in marital decisions .... 
Disparity in the control of marital property moves beyond simple inequality-
which an individual may rightly choose as a means to other ends--to 
subordination, which systematically denies the importance of whatever ends that 
individual chooses. As subordination in marriage is a threat to a spouse's basic 
personhood, the marital community must be bounded by a commitment to 
equality. 
See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 91 (citations omitted). In addition: 
Any contract reflects the power positions of the parties. In most instances men are 
more powerful than women because men are more likely to control economic 
wealth. Thus, most contracts between husbands and wives will be unfavorable to 
the wife. \Vhile courts could supervise all contracts between husbands and wives for 
fairness, cost barriers to litigation block access to the courts in most cases. The best 
the courts can do is refuse to enforce all of these contracts affecting ongoing 
relationships. In most instances, this will avoid adding judicial power to that which 
husbands have as a result of their economic position. 
!d. (citing sources omitted); see also 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 
253 (1995). 
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as having opted out of the special privilege that comes with a commitment to 
equality. 
2. Including Unmarried Couples Who Share Their Income 
Once one accepts the principle that marriage-based income splitting 
should be limited to income-sharing spouses, the question arises: why 
continue to exclude income-sharing unmarried couples? The answer 
depends on our cultural attitude towards unmarried unions. Though the 
current state of these attitudes is the subject of much speculation, several 
factors lean in favor of extending income splitting to unmarried income 
sharers. 
First, the noncommodification argument applies equally well to income-
sharing married and unmarried couples alike, regardless of whether they are 
composed of same- or opposite-sex partners. 110 Second, if applied strictly, 
the current separate-filing requirement applied to unmarried couples who 
pool their income conflicts with most people's understanding of the nature 
of these transfers as neither pure gift nor compensation. Most importantly, 
though a significant number of Americans remain opposed to government 
recognition of gay marriage, there is a clear trend in favor of extending 
marriage-based benefits to unmarried couples who formalize their 
commitments in other ways, including through civil union or domestic 
h . . . Ill partners 1p reg1stnes. 
IV. A NEW "I Do": ECONOMIC UNITY-BASED INCOME SPLITIING 
A. PROPOSAL CORE FEATURES 
The problem before us, again, is that the marriage-based criterion for 
income splitting is both over- and under-inclusive; it embraces economically 
separate marrieds and excludes unmarrieds who pool their income. The 
challenge then is to devise a system that makes income splitting for tax 
purposes contingent on a legally binding commitment to share income 
equally. In other words, the current marriage-based criterion for income 
splitting must be expanded and contracted: expanded to include unmarried 
income poolers and contracted to exclude economically separate marrieds. 
I propose that Congress unbundle the presumption of economic unity 
for income tax purposes from the institution of marriage by devising a new 
criterion for income splitting. Taxpayers would be permitted to file jointly if 
and only if they obligate to share equal legal entitlement to all taxable 
110. Patricia Cain has demonstrated, focusing on gay couples in particular, that when 
forced to file as separate individuals, unmarried gay partners face the same administrative and 
psychic burdens allocating transfers amongst themselves as married couples do. See Cain, supra 
note 20, at 114. 
111. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
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income. 112 Couples who wish to file jointly would be required to attach an 
affidavit to their return attesting that they have entered into such a 
commitment, whether by virtue of being married in a state that requires 
equal spousal income sharing, 113 through a domestic partnership 
registration where income sharing is an integral part of such registration, 114 
b . 115 or y pnvate contract. 
112. Kornhauser flags this alternative, but does not explore it in detail. See Kornhauser, 
supra note 5, at 72-73. 
113. This would include income from separate property. Under current laws, the only states 
that fall into this category are Idaho, Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin. See IRS Manual, supra 
note 40, Exhibit 25.18.1-1, Comparison of State Law Differences in Community Property States. 
114. Like most states' default marriage laws, most domestic partnership registries do not 
require income sharing. Rather, they incorporate commitments similar to the marital duty of 
mutual support, e.g., to "share basic living expenses," "share the common necessities and tasks 
of one household," and be "responsible for each other's welfare," or to be "jointly responsible 
for basic living expenses." CITY AND COUNTY OF S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, STATE AND LOCAL 
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP REGISTRIES, http:/ /sfprospector.com/site/sfhumanrights_ 
page.asp?id;6283. California's "Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act," on the other 
hand, requires that registered domestic partners take on the duties and obligations of marriage, 
which, in California, means income sharing as per the community property model (though for 
state income tax purposes a domestic partner's earned income may not be treated as 
community property). See CAL. FAM. CODE§ 297.5(a) & (g) (West 2004). 
115. In most states couples unable or unwilling to legally unite their finances through 
marriage, domestic partnership, civil union, or other marriage alternative are able to do so 
through private contract, just as Guy and Ella Earl did more than a century ago. See IHARA ET 
AL., supra note 85, at 2/9-10; 1 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 109, at 275. Ihara, Warner, and 
Hertz note: 
[T] he courts of nearly every state and the District of Columbia now enforce written 
contracts between unmarried partners. . . . [However,] Illinois remains an 
exception to the general acceptance of contract rights for unmarried couples. 
There the courts still hold that the "immoral" nature of living together prevents a 
couple from forming a contract. (Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E. 2d 1204 (1979).) 
However, some progress has been made. Most Illinois courts have carefully 
suggested that contracts not based entirely on living together, and not resembling 
marriage claims, may be enforced. (Spafford v. Coats, 118 III. App. 3d 566 (1983).) 
This is not true of all Illinois courts, however. (See Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E. 2d 920 
(1990) [)]. 
IHARA ET AL., supra note 85, at 2/9-10. Note, however, that§ 20-45.3 of the Code of Virginia 
prohibits any "civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of the 
same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage." Though it has yet to 
be challenged, several commentators, including former Virginia governor Mark Warner, believe 
that the provision is unconstitutional. See Press Release, Governor Mark Warner Announces His 
Action on HB 751, available at http:/ /www.equalityvirginia.org/atf/cf/{F56F0407-AD15-456F-
9A9E-EB9BC57B69AC}/Gov_ Warner_press_release_on_HB_751.doc. Governor Warner stated: 
Article 1 Section 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits any state from 
impairing the obligations of existing contracts. The sweeping language of HB 751 
plainly violates that constitutional provision by seeking to void existing contractual 
rights. Furthermore, HB 751 would appear to violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting. certain contracts between two people of the 
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1. Legal Entitlements-Based Measure oflncome Sharing 
In a perfect world, income splitting would be available only to couples 
who jointly own all their income and behave accordingly-functioning as 
equal decision makers, sharing control, and benefiting equally from their 
joint income. But as we have seen, behavior is extremely difficult to gauge, 
and requiring the Service to evaluate how any two people distribute burdens 
and privileges amongst themselves would be both unacceptably invasive and 
administratively impracticable. Recognizing the subjective and unverifiable 
nature of these determinations and seeing that legal entitlements are 
relatively easy to verify, tax law in many instances applies a rule that tax 
liability follows legal entitlement to income.116 In other words, it taxes 
same sex (regardless of their sexual orientation) while permitting the exact same 
contracts between men and women. 
!d. Additional commentaries on the proVIsiOn may be accessed at 
http:/ /www.equalityvirginia.org/site/pp.asp?c=dfliiTMIG&b=181005. A state constitutional 
amendment that would deny legal recognition to unmarried couples will be the subject of a 
referendum in the fall of 2006. 
116. Generally, the mere right or option to enter into a transaction has no tax 
consequences unless and until the transaction has actually taken place (i.e., unless legal title is 
actually transferred). Under certain circumstances, however, the Internal Revenue Service has 
ruled that "economic compulsion" may factor into its determination as to whether a taxable 
event has occurred. The economic-£ompulsion standard requires a showing that no other 
course of action would be economically rational. The mere expectation that a transaction will 
occur, a pattern of behavior, or the intent to follow through with a transaction does not rise to 
the level of economic compulsion. See Rev. Rul. 03-97, 2003-2 C.B. 380; Rev. Rul. 03-7, 2003-1 
C.B. 363 (holding that, despite shareholder's intent and likelihood to use shares already under 
shareholder's control to satisfy a commitment to deliver shares or their cash equivalent at a 
future date, no sale occurred until actual delivery). Revenue Ruling 03-7, relying in part on 
Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941), noted 
that: 
Despite the taxpayer's intent to use the purchased stock to close his earliest open 
short sale, and despite a showing that he followed a consistent practice of applying 
purchases to close out his earliest open short sale, the taxpayer was held not to 
have closed a short sale because the stock was not actually delivered to the stock 
lender. ... Thus, Richardson supports the conclusion that even if the shareholder 
intends to complete a sale by delivering identified stock, that intent alone does not 
cause a transaction to be deemed a sale, as long as the taxpayer retains the right to 
determine whether the identified stock will in fact be delivered. 
Rev. Rul. 03-7, 2003-1 C.B. 363. 
Another context in which formal legal title may be disregarded for tax purposes is in 
situations to which the "step transaction" doctrine may apply. The doctrine "treats a series of 
formally separate 'steps' as a single transaction if such steps are in substance integrated, 
interdependent, and focused toward a particular result." Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 
(1987). Three tests have developed for determining whether separate transactions will be 
viewed as one: the "binding commitment" test, the "mutual interdependence" test, and the 
"end result" test. See BORIS I. BITIKER & jAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS '1[12.61 (3] {7th ed. 2000). 
The ample evidence of married couples who do not share income clearly 
demonstrates that marriage alone does not economically compel spousal sharing. As we have 
1546 91 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2006] 
people based on their rights to income even when, as a practical matter, they 
may be unlikely to exercise these rights. Accordingly, for our purposes, 
economic unity must be measured in terms of legal entitlements, not 
statistical likelihood of sharing behavior. 
Separate filing proponents like Kornhauser and Zelenak, who argue 
persuasively that legal entitlements matter less than cultural stereotypes and 
the raw power that comes with earner status, are not likely to be satisfied 
with this approach. 117 But given a choice between marriage-based income 
seen, marriage also does not constitute a binding commitment to pool and share income. 
Finally, the existence of economically separate spouses indicates that matrimony and economic 
union are not mutually interdependent steps such that one would be fruitless without the other, 
and the intended or expected end result of wedlock is not necessarily economic unity. 
As Kornhauser has noted: 
Thorson states that historically, coordinating the tax unit with the legal property 
unit was of great importance. For example, the family was the tax unit under the 
Civil War income tax statutes, because under property law, the husband 
substantially owned both his wife's and children's income .... By the time the 
income tax was instituted under the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, married 
women's property rights had been established, which necessitated considering the 
individual as the taxable unit. The "deep commitment" to this approach is evident 
in the Supreme Court's 1930 rulings in Lucas v. Earl ... and Poe v. Seaborn. 
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 96 n.103 (citing Douglas Thorson, An Analysis of the Sources of 
Continued Controversy over the Tax Treatment of Family Income, 18 NAT'L TAX]. 113, 115 (1965)); see 
also supra note 30. 
This argument is related to, but at bottom is quite different from Zelenak's argument 
for a control-, rather than consumption-based, measure of ability to pay. Zelenak's control is in 
the end also a behavioral measure; it is based on an earner's control over whether she will earn 
the income and on her decision to stay in the marriage, rather than the legal measure of who 
actually owns the income once it has been earned. See Zelenak, supra note 5, at 354-55. 
117. See generally Kornhauser, supra note 5. Zelenak believes that taxes should be based on 
control of income, and he assumes that control over earned income resides entirely with the 
earner, regardless of whether legal ownership over this income is shared with another. See 
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 380 ("Under an income tax (as opposed to a consumption tax) income 
should be taxed to the person with the closest connection to its source, and that person is 
always the earner, regardless of contractual assignments or marital property regimes. Under this 
analysis, income splitting is not appropriate regardless of legal ownership of earned income." 
(citations omitted)). Zelenakjustifies this assumption by explaining that "[e]arners always have 
a closer connection to their earnings than anyone else can possibly have. They always have 
ultimate control, because they can always determine whether or how much to work." !d. at 357. 
These two statements contain an unsubstantiated leap. While it is reasonable to assume that 
earners have more control over their earnings than others, this does not mean that "[t]hey 
always have ultimate control." !d. (emphasis added). The operative question, assuming control is 
the proper guide for tax liability, is whether an earner who is legally committed to sharing her 
income with a spouse controls this income so much more than her spouse so as to justifY taxing 
her and only her on the income. Assume the earner exercises seventy percent control over the 
income-she can decide whether and how much to work, and her earning power gives her 
additional decision-making clout regarding how earnings will be spent (even though legally her 
spouse is an equal co-owner). Still, income splitting, which presumes a fifty-fifty control 
structure, would more truthfully represent reality than would a single filer approach (which 
presumes a one hundred to zero breakdown). For Zelenak to be right, earners who are legally 
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splitting-which requires neither legal nor behavioral equality-and my 
proposal-which at least demands equal legal entitlements-even firm 
separate-filing believers should recognize the latter as a lesser evil. 
2. Rates, Bonuses, and Penalties 
Recognizing that income splitting bestows a special benefit that violates 
assignment of income principles, the rate brackets applicable to income-
pooling couples would be set so as to reflect public assessment of the relative 
social value of allowing committed couples to treat each member's labor as 
"by and for" the couple. Most likely, the new schedule would resemble the 
current married-filingjointly schedule so as not to reduce present marriage 
bonuses for spouses who formalize income-sharing arrangements. 
Couples for whom filing jointly would be disadvantageous (e.g., equal 
earners) would be able to file separately, using the same rates as those 
applicable to individual filers (i.e., there would be no special structure as 
there is today for married individuals filing separately). Thus, there would 
be no "penalty." Since couples neutrality is no longer the conceptual hook 
supporting income splitting, this solution to the current marriage penalty 
does not run into the conceptual pitfalls of previous proposals to allow 
optional separate filing for married taxpayers. Couples neutrality dictates 
that a husband and wife making $50,000 each should pay the same taxes as a 
one-earner couple making $100,000 because their combined income is the 
same. As Zelenak put it, "The purpose of joint filing is to impose equal tax 
on equal income couples, and optional joint filing defeats that purpose." 118 
The by-and-for-the-couple explanation says that income splitting should be 
extended to the one-earner couple not because it is economically equivalent 
to the equal earners (as we have seen, it is not), but because we are 
uncomfortable applying the assignment of income doctrine to egalitarian 
partnerships or treating intra-couple transfers as detached and disinterested 
gifts; the mechanism through which we match tax treatment with our by-
and-for-the-couple ideal is income splitting. Thus, income-sharing one-
obligated to share their income would have to exercise more than seventy-five percent control 
over their earnings. Whether this is in fact the case is anybody's guess. Zelenak recognizes the 
futility of investigations into the power dynamics within couples. Zelenak, supra note 5, at 357 
("The basic [income tax] principles are very simple. Earned income is taxed to the earner, and 
property income is taxed to the owner. The law normally looks no further into questions of 
power than that, and reasonably so."). However, he insists that an earner has total control over 
his earnings, even if he is obligated to share it with his wife. Id. at 382. See also Jones, supra note 
34, at 269 (referring to community property interests of nonearner wives as "'a right without a 
remedy'" (quoting Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th 
Cong. 1475 (1942) (briefofBurnite [sic] Shelton Matthews, Chairman of the Lawyers Council, 
National Woman's Party)); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1010 ("Equality of de jure treatment 
comes at the price of inequality of de facto effect. And, we are not being neutral in regard to 
different models of the family: we are exalting single-earner households over all competing 
visions."). 
ll8. Zelenak, supra note 6, at 18. 
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earners get a benefit compared with financially independent couples and 
compared with singles making the same amount, but they need not be put 
in the same position as the equal earners with the same combined income. 
As a result the couple earning $50,000 each will pay less in taxes than the 
$100,000 one-earner couple. 119 
3. Related Taxpayers 
Related taxpayers (excluding spouses) would not be permitted to file 
jointly because the cultural underpinnings of income splitting are rooted in 
a partnership ideal of marriage or marriage-like relationships. Also, allowing 
family members to file jointly would erode one of the central objectives of 
the estate tax. 12° Finally, the limitation on related joint filers represents an 
. . b 121 tmportant ann-a use measure. 
It should be noted that in most instances this limitation would be 
inconsequential because relatives do not generally share income equally. 
Rather, more frequently, one relative supports another with less than fifty 
percent of her income, and this support should be accounted for through 
dependency exemptions, not income splitting, which is grounded in a 
completely different rationale, .namely an assumption that both taxpayers 
own and control all income equally. For this reason, the proposal would 
eliminate the "head of household" category, replacing it with more generous 
d d . 122 epen ency exemptions. 
119. Cf id. at 13-17 (discussing politically unpopular distributional effects of previous 
optional separate filing proposals). 
120. According to Dukeminier and Johanson, such central objective is preventing the 
perpetuation oflarge concentrations of wealth: 
With the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration ... [t)he leveling of great inherited 
fortunes was formally accepted as an object of the estate tax. In a message to 
Congress, President Roosevelt declared: "The desire to provide security for one's 
self and one's family is natural and wholesome, but it is adequately served by a 
reasonable inheritance. Great accumulations of wealth cannot be justified on the 
basis of personal and family security. In the last analysis such accumulations 
amount to the perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of control in a 
relatively few individuals over the employment and welfare of many, many 
others .... [I)nherited economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals of this 
generation as inherited political power was inconsistent with the ideals of the 
generation which established our government." 
See JESSE DUKEM1NIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 992 (2005) 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 74-1681, at 2 (1935)). 
121. Tax law is often suspicious of related-party transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2000) 
(disallowing a deduction for losses from sales or exchanges between related parties). 
122. Because the proper justification for income splitting was not previously articulated, 
Congress has failed to distinguish the logic behind income splitting from the logic justifYing 
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4. Friends 
Though the by-and-for-the-couple framework is generally associated 
with romantic partnerships, in some instances, especially among the 
elderly, 123 platonic friendships evolve into income-sharing partnerships. This 
is not the type of partnership for which, as a cultural matter, the income-
splitting joint return exists. Nevertheless, such pairs would be permitted to 
file jointly as long as they undertook the income-sharing commitments 
outlined above. This compromise is necessary to avoid the obvious privacy 
and line-drawing concerns that would arise were we to devise a standard for 
determining whether a given relationship is romantic. As a policy matter, 
extending the benefits of joint filing to the rare income-sharing friendship is 
not particularly troublesome as these relationships contribute to the 
common good in many of the same ways as marriage and other intimate 
h. 124 partners tps. 
support exemptions on two important occasions. First, in 1951, the House Ways and Means 
Committee report explained the rationale behind the head of household category as follows: 
It is believed that taxpayers, not having spouses but nevertheless required to 
maintain a household for the benefit of other individuals, are in a somewhat 
similar position to married couples who, because they may share their income, are 
treated under present law substantially as if they were two single individuals each 
with half of the total income of the couple. The income of a head of household 
who must maintain a home for a child, for example, is likely to be shared with the 
child to the extent necessary to maintain the home, and raise and educate the 
child. This, it is believed, justifies the extension of some of the benefits of income 
splitting. 
H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 11 (1951). Again Congress's 1969 decision to extend income splitting 
to surviving spouses with dependents was explained in reference to support obligations. See 
Ventry, supra note 10, at 313 ("On extending full income splitting to surviving spouses with 
dependents, the staffs [of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation and the 
Committee on Finance] explained that the House felt these individuals maintained 'full 
obligations of a married couple toward their children after their spouses die.'" (quoting STAFFS 
OF THE jOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION AND THE COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG., 
SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 103 (Comm. Print 1969))); see also 
Cain, supra note 20, at 101, 120, 123. 
123. See jane Gross, Older Women Team up to Face Future Together, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at 
AI. 
124. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
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5. Enforcement, Dissolution, and Anti-Abuse Measures 
Just as the current system relies on state law to establish marital status,125 
so under the economic-unity proposal the SeiVice would not be responsible 
for enforcing the legal entitlements that fulfill the eligibility criterion for 
joint filing. Rather, the obligations of unmarried joint filers would be 
enforced under extstmg state contract law principles, 126 and the 
enforcement of spousal rights and obligations would be addressed according 
to local family law.127 Should a union that qualifies for joint filing dissolve, 
the division of assets would likewise be handled under state contract or 
125. See Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 ("The marital status of individuals as determined 
under state law is recognized in the administration of the Federal income taX laws."). Note, 
however, that the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defines marriage for federal 
purposes as a legal union between one man and one woman. Therefore, for federal income taX 
purposes, a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts may not file a joint return. IRS 
Publication 17, at 23, available at http:/ /www.irs.gov /publications/pl7 (last visited Feb. 4, 
2006). Scholars and practitioners are currently engaged in a heated debate over whether 
California domestic partners-whose unions are governed by the same community property 
rules applicable to married couples in that state-should be permitted to income split as per Poe 
v. Seaborn. See Patricia A. Cain, &litigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community Income of California 
Registered Domestic Partners (University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-39, 2006), 
available at http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=881763. In a nonbinding memorandum, the Internal 
Revenue Service recently advised that the Poe decision "does not extend to registered domestic 
partners." I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200608038 (Feb. 24, 2006). Since the economic-unity 
proposal is marriage neutral, this problem would be solved. For a response to the 
Memorandum, see generally Dennis]. Ventry, Jr., No Income Splitting for Domestic Partners: How 
the IRS Erred, llO TAX NOTES 1221 (2005). 
126. See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that in California, 
disputes between unmarried partners must be determined based on contract law principles). 
The Marvin rule has been widely adopted in other states. Note however that it no longer applies 
to California unmarried couples who have registered domestic partnerships. These couples are 
governed by the same regime applicable to married couples. 1 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 
109, at 274; see also IHARA ET AL., supra note 85, at 2/9. 
127. This would likely produce some variation from state to state. From a taX perspective, 
the result would not be perfectly uniform, though it would guarantee a much closer match 
between taX treatment and legal entitlement to income than under the present system. As a 
constitutional matter, this lack of uniformity would not be troublesome; the Supreme Court has 
interpreted Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution-requiring that "all Duties, Imports and 
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States" -as requiring "geographic" uniformity 
rather than "intrinsic" uniformity. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 92-93 (1900). In other 
words, as long as a federal plan "operate[s] generally throughout the United States," lack of 
uniformity resulting from differences in state property laws does not present constitutional 
problems. See id. at 96; see also Pahl v. Comm'r, 150 F.3d 1124, ll28 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Courts 
look to the tax statutes and interpreting cases to determine what interest is sufficient to trigger 
tax liability, and to state law to determine whether the taXpayer had such an interest."); Ballard 
v. United States, 17 F.3d ll6, ll8 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although federal law defines partnerships 
for purposes of applying the partnership income taXation scheme . . . it is state law that 
determines when a partner is liable for the obligations-including employment taXes-of his 
partnership." (citation omitted)); United States v. Hays, 877 F.2d 843, 844 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1989) 
("[C]ourts have assumed that the liability of a general partner for the taX obligations of the 
partnership is determined by state law rather than federal law."). 
ANEW"IDO" 1551 
family law. Property settlements, alimony, and child support would receive 
the same income tax treatment as under the current system, and this 
treatment would be extended to the dissolution of other partnerships that 
qualified for joint filing. 
There is a risk that taxpayers will enter into fraudulent agreements so as 
to gain access to the tax savings of joint filing without taking on the 
attendant income-sharing obligations. For example, income earners and 
non-earners could file jointly, agreeing to split the tax benefit but not the 
underlying income. For this reason, joint filing would not be available to 
family members, other than spouses. Also, the new regime would be 
governed by civil and criminal penalties applicable to fraudulent filers under 
the current system.128 Finally, the heart of the proposed system-equal 
entitlement to all taxable income-itself serves as a deterrent to cheaters. 
The non-earner could always renege on her promise and demand more 
than the agreed-upon "fee" for her signature. The earner would then face a 
choice between criminal penalties and honoring the joint filing 
commitment-i.e., ceding fifty percent of her income for the year or years in 
question to the threatening co-party to the scam. 
6. Limitation to Pairs 
As a matter of tax policy, there is no reason to limit the economic unity 
option to pairs. Polygamous families, collectives, and three or more 
housemates who obligate to pool and equally share all income should, 
theoretically speaking, be treated accordingly for tax purposes. As a political 
matter, however, although societal acceptance of non-marital two-member 
partnerships has increased dramatically, other partnerships have not 
received social sanction. Thus, the economic unity proposal stands a better 
chance of becoming a reality if it is limited to pairs. 
7. Effect on Other Provisions 
In addition to affecting the rate schedules in section 1 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, other sections relating to marital status, like section 267-
which denies deductions for losses on sales between related persons-and 
section 1041-which provides for nonrecognition of transfers between 
spouses-would be changed to apply to economically united taxpayers 
regardless of their marital status. 129 
128. See I.R.C. §§ 6663, 7206 (2000). 
129. Other I.R.C. sections, the application of which relies on marital status, include section 
68 (concerning the limitation on itemized deductions), section 163(h)(3)(B) (concerning the 
home mortgage interest deduction), section 179 (allowing taxpayers to expense certain capital 
expenditures), section 221 (providing for student loan interest deduction), section 21 
(household and dependent care credit), and section 32 (providing the earned income tax 
credit). These provisions currently create an advantage for unmarried couples. For a discussion 
of these provisions and their implications for the gay marriage debate, see Theodore P. Seto, 
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8. Effect on Case Law 
In terms of the case law, the proposal calls for a legislative override of 
Lucas v. Earf3° --income-sharing contracts would no longer be irrelevant for 
tax purposes-and a limitation on the principle of Poe v. Seabom131-spouses 
in community-property states would still be eligible to income split but only 
so long as they have not contracted out of spousal sharing requirements. 
The proposal would also override the pre-1948 cases that struggled with the 
conceptual contradiction that resulted from the combination of Lucas and 
n 132 
roe. 
9. Gift and Estate Tax Implications 
The proposal's gift and estate tax implications are outside the scope of 
this Article, but assuming that the general structure of gift and estate taxes 
remains constant, acceptance of the equality requirement vis-a-vis income 
splitting would imply that a similar principle should govern the gift and 
estate tax context. Currently, many federal gift and estate tax provisions treat 
married taxpayers as merged economic units. 133 For reasons similar to those 
applicable to income splitting, gift and estate tax provisions treating married 
taxpayers as units should theoretically be modified so as to apply only to 
taxpayers who, like Mr. and Mrs. Earl, legally share all of their assets during 
their lives together regardless of their marital status. 134 
B. POIJCY lMPIJCA TIONS 
Equality-based income splitting would eliminate the discriminatory 
effects of the marriage bonus-the exclusion of economically united couples 
from the benefits of income splitting and the free ride now extended to 
economically uncommitted high-earners who happen to be married. It 
would also diminish the innocent-spouse problem: Couples filing jointly 
The Assumption of Selfzshness in the Internal Revenue Code: Reflections on the Unintended Tax 
Advantages of Gay Marriage 18-19 (Loyola Law School Los Angeles, Legal Studies Paper No. 
2005-33, 2005), available at http:/ /papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=850645. 
130. 281 u.s. 111 (1930). 
131. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
132. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,49-57 (1944) (Douglas,]., dissenting). 
133. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2000) (providing for a marital deduction from the estate of a 
decedent equal to the amount passing to a surviving spouse); Id. § 2523 (providing for a gift tax 
deduction equal to the amount of inter-vivos transfers to a spouse); Id. § 2513 (treating gifts 
made by one spouse to a third party as if they were made one-half by the donor spouse and one-
half by the other spouse). 
134. The number of couples prepared to merge assets is likely to be much smaller than the 
number of those ready to share income. A strict application of the principles of the proposal to 
gift and estate taxes would therefore defeat a current public policy that many believe to be 
important: encouraging spouses to gift and bequeath to each other. A possible solution might 
be to extend partial gift and estate tax benefits to couples that share only income and full 
benefits to those that share income as well as assets equally. 
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would still bear joint and several liability for taxes owed, but now this 
potential liability would come along with actual co-ownership of the income 
being taxed. The marriage penalty would be erased completely because 
marital status would have no income tax relevance. There would also be no 
marriage (or couples) penalty because the proposal allows for optional 
separate filing. For couples filing jointly, the stacking effect would remain, 
but its marginalization of secondary earners would be alleviated since they 
would at least have an ownership interest in their partners' wages. (It should 
be noted that the proposal is consistent with a reintroduction of the two-
earner deduction, which would address the stacking effect directly.) 
The proposed system would also create an incentive for one-earner 
couples to formally agree that the work of housewives/husbands and 
caretakers is equal to the monetary contributions of breadwinners. 135 This 
would likely diminish the vulnerability of dependent spouses who are 
already treated as equal or close-to-equal partners. Equality-based income 
splitting would not, of course, turn unequal partnerships into equal ones, 
but unlike marriage-based income splitting, it would not be complicit in 
perpetuating the marital-unity fairytale. Instead, it would encourage 
transparency in relationships early on, exposing the common mismatch in 
expectations that is a common cause of domestic strife.136 Now, income 
splitting is based on a fiction. Under my proposal, it would at least be based 
on enforceable legal entitlements. 
The proposal's exclusion of non-egalitarian marriages from income 
splitting is consistent with the broad appeal of the partnership ideal of 
135. Economic unity-based income splitting might therefore reverse what Pamela Gann 
views as a negative incentive structure set up by the 1948 Act, which, she argues, solidified 
separate ownership and contributed to the financial dependence of wives on their husbands. See 
Gann, supra note 5, at 47; Cf Jones, supra note 34, at 273 (discussing tax law as a vehicle for 
changing power between husbands and wives, and noting that "[t]he spread of community-
property laws during the period from 1939 to 194 7 is testimony to the efficacy of the federal tax 
incentive for readjustment of economic power between spouses."). 
136. See ROBERT STEPHAN COHEN, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 101 (2002) ("(T]here is no 
better time to assess financial expectations and individual spending habits than when two 
people are still getting to know each other."). See generally LENORE]. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE 
CONTRACT (1981) (advocating for intimate contracts in lieu of marriage); Equality in Marriage 
Institute, Educating Women and Men About the Importance of Equality in Marriage and 
Divorce, www.equalityinmarriage.org. 
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marriage, 137 indirectly resurrecting a positive aspect of traditional marriage 
without its patriarchal taint. At the same time, the proposal does not 
threaten states' sovereignty over family law or freedom of contract principles 
that have undergirded greater acceptance for pre- and post-marital 
arrangements. 138 Unlike the pre-1948 period when federal tax law created an 
incentive for states to convert to community property law, the proposal 
leaves marriage law to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. 139 Civil 
137. Frantz and Dagan articulate their VISIOn of marriage as an "egalitarian liberal 
community." Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 125. Frantz and Dagan explain: 
A regime that grants each spouse an immediate half interest in the marital estate 
recognizes the special relationship between the spouses and reinforces each 
spouse's sense of equal participation in the marriage. By contrast, a system of 
separate property treats spouses as proprietors in their relationship with one 
another, and furthermore places the non-propertied spouse in a dependent 
subordinate position. 
/d. (citations omitted). "Because expecting women to protect themselves against marital 
subordination is both unrealistic and undesirable, the law must provide institutional guarantees 
of gender equality to support marital community." /d. at 93-94; see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, 
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 152 ( 1989). 
All states have adopted some form of equitable distribution, indicating a trend toward 
an egalitarian view of marriage. See Developments, supra note 36, at 2098 (identifying "an internal 
inconsistency in divorce law" produced by the "conflict between two differing conceptions of 
the marital relationship: marriage as contract and marriage as partnership"). Specifically: 
While judicial deference to antenuptial agreements has grown, the United States 
has simultaneously experienced a trend toward equal division of marital property, 
reflecting the conception of marriage as parmership and rejecting the notion of a 
patriarchal relationship. The notion of equality inherent in the partnership 
conception of marriage is at odds with a system in which courts refuse to review 
antenuptial agreements for substantive fairness at the time of their enforcement. 
/d. at 2077. The article recommends instituting a "system in which judges undertake substantive 
fairness review at the time of an agreement's enforcement and presumptively invalidate 
agreements failing to approximate equal division of marital property." Id. at 2098. 
138. See Developments, supra note 36, at 2078 (describing a "trend in favor of enforcement 
[of antenuptial agreements], more limited judicial review, and greater respect for parties' 
freedom of contract"); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, 
in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 201, 205 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999), quoted in 
Developments, supra note 36, at 2078 n.13 ("The law's embrace of private ordering in marriage is 
part of a broader policy of maximizing the freedom of individuals to pursue personal ends in 
intimate relationships."). 
139. A nationwide, mandatory spousal sharing requirement might backfire by discouraging 
marriage among couples who, while they may not be prepared to share their income, are 
prepared to take on other marital obligations-such as the presumption of paternity, the 
(minimal) duty of mutual support, medical decision-making responsibilities, and monogamy. In 
an age of high divorce rates and multiple marriages, moneyed fiances or fiances with 
commitments to children or spouses from prior marriages may have good reasons for hesitating 
before they cede ownership over future earning at the altar. And yet, economically weak 
individuals, one might argue, are better off marrying their lovers even if their marriage is 
governed by a premarital agreement that gives them minimal ownership rights. But see Gann, 
supra note 5, at 50-51. 
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marriage supplies couples with a wide range of useful default rules, many of 
which do not concern property, including the presumption of paternity, 
hospital access, automatic power of attorney, and decision-making power 
over funeral arrangements. Under my marriage-blind proposal, couples 
could continue to marry (or not) regardless of whether they share their 
income, and each state's marriage laws could continue to include their own 
presumptions or mandatory rules regarding property sharing during 
marriage. 
Nevertheless, serious consideration should be given to the risk that the 
availability of equality-based income-splitting options might gradually 
transform marriage by eroding spousal-sharing requirements or equal-
partnership presumptions that do currently exist. For example, a married 
couple's choice not to file jointly might factor into an equitable distribution 
proceeding as a persuasive indication that the spouses did not view their 
partnership as a fifty-fifty proposition and that neither spouse could have 
reasonably relied on such an interpretation.140 This would likely prejudice 
economically weaker spouses, rolling back hard-won protections. 
Counterbalancing this risk is the possibility that the new law would lead 
social and religious institutions to encourage, even demand, that couples 
unite their finances, thereby bolstering spousal sharing and encouraging 
other egalitarian unions. For example, a given religion might declare that 
marriage for purposes of that religion must be an economic partnership of 
equals. 
Consideration should also be given to the ongoing debate regarding the 
relative merits of community-property versus separate-property regimes as 
vehicles for advancing gender equality.141 Regardless of this debate, it is clear 
140. Equitable distribution is generally based on judicial discretion. 
141. Though mandating spousal equality and unity seems appealing at first glance, there is 
a longstanding debate as to whether a community model would help women achieve ever-
elusive equality. See HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXT, 
CAsES, AND MATERIALS 261-74 (5th ed. 2002). 
Some argue that separate property regimes are better for women because when 
women and men pool their resources, men inevitably control them. Thus, even if separate 
property models are likely to leave women with less in terms of formal ownership rights, total 
ownership over less property is better than the semblance of ownership over more property. The 
thrust of this argument informs several commentators' views of the logic behind married 
women's property acts. It also inspired opposition to the trend towards adopting community 
property laws on the eve of the 1948 Act. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN 
COUPLES 109 (1983), cited in Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 90 ("In traditional marriage, 
interdependence is usually achieved at the cost of the wife's autonomy and her participation on 
an equal basis in decision-making."); McCAFFREY, supra note 51, at 11-48; Bittker, supra note 29, 
at 1399-1414;Jones, supra note 34, at 259; Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 73-76, 102. Arps and 
Rees write: 
[F]eminist theory undercuts the very premise that the family is an economic unit. 
The economic unit theory assumes that the family is a monolithic, homogeneous 
group in which all members share the same tastes and resources, including 
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that separate property-style marriage is inconsistent with income splitting. 
More broadly, for reasons discussed above, the current mismatch between 
internal economic unity and presumed economic unity for purposes of a 
couple's relationship with the state has a slew of negative consequences. If 
we are going to keep the income-splitting joint return, the only defensible 
criterion for joint filing is income sharing. At the same time, efforts already 
underway to improve community property systems142 should be broadened 
beyond community-property states and beyond marriage to assist all couples 
seeking to form equitable personal partnerships. 
The proposal's introduction of income splitting to income sharing 
unmarried couples is more controversial. However, once the public turns its 
attention to the wide state-to-state variations in what marriage means and to 
the broad freedom to contract out of all but the most minimal marital 
obligations, Americans may well agree that the relationship between income 
splitting and civil marriage is arbitrary. (Again, though groups that oppose 
extending marriage-like benefits or protections to same-sex couples would 
reject the proposal, they are in the minority. Most Americans oppose gay 
marriage but support civil unions.) 
All things being equal, it is not clear whether adoption of the proposal 
would increase or decrease revenue. On the one hand, the proposal 
expands the pool of those eligible to income split by making joint filing 
available to economically united unmarrieds. On the other hand, the 
proposal contracts the pool by excluding spouses who do not commit to 
unite. Which group would be larger? Would newly created income-splitting 
benefits amount to more in lost revenues than the rise in revenue 
attributable to married taxpayers who will no longer enjoy marriage 
bonuses?143 These questions would have to be investigated in detail in 
evaluating the proposal. 
Finally, in addition to rationalizing the tax treatment of economically 
united couples and of economically separate marrieds, the proposal would 
begin to alleviate the growing confusion attributable to the proliferation of 
income, equally. Under this "benign patriarch" theory of the family, the male 
"head of household" traditionally speaks and acts for the unit. 
Patricia F. Apps & Ray Rees, Taxation and the Household, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 355, 355 ( 1988), cited in 
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 97 (referring to GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged 
ed. 1991)). 
On the other hand, some commentators hold fast to the ideal that marital unity and 
equality are compatible. See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 51, at 36 ("Reva Siegel's historical and 
legal research shows first that the married women's property acts emerging from the nineteenth 
century were actually a rather conservative attempt to forestall a claim by women for equal 
ownership of all marital assets ... .");Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36. 
142. See KAY & WEST, supra note 141, at 269. 
143. The fact that pooling is less prevalent among unequal-earners and that these earners 
also receive the biggest bonuses suggests significant potential revenue gains from the exclusion 
of nonsharing spouses. 
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inconsistent domestic partner mandates by state and local governments144 by 
creating a clear federal standard for allocation of privileges, the rationales 
for which are based on a presumption of economic unity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In his seminal 1975 article defending marriage-based income splitting, 
Boris Bittker wrote: "the concept of a marital partnership is a widespread 
ideal and, whether realized in fact or not, it is an appealing principle to use 
in fixing the tax liability of married couples. "145 Marital partnership is indeed 
an appealing principle. If it were realized in fact, and if the marriage were 
open to all and only to economically united couples, marriage would 
constitute a reasonable criterion for allocating income splitting privileges. 
But family law in the United States falls far short of these ideals. As a result, 
the current income splitting system gives a windfall to financially 
uncommitted high-earners, penalizes unmarried couples, exposes low- and 
non-earners to potential liability attributable to income they never owned, 
and creates a marriage penalty. 
Working women spend approximately twice as much time as their male 
counterparts housekeeping and caring for children;146 men spend more 
time at their jobs and on sports and leisure/47 and they continue to earn 
144. See ESKRIDGE & HUi'rfER, supra note 50, at 791-94; Kelley Blassingame, Domestic Partner 
Mandates Complicate Decision making, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, Mar. 2004. Bowman notes: 
The legal treatment of cohabitation in the United States has been radically and 
rapidly transformed during the first few years of the twenty-first century .... There 
are great regional variances-from Massachusetts, where marriage [has become] 
available to same-sex couples ... to Nebraska, where the state constitution was 
amended in 2000 to prohibit recognition not only of same-sex marriage but also of 
civil unions or domestic partnerships of any sort (Neb. Const, Art. I, § 29). Similar 
variety exists as to opposite-sex cohabitants. The state of Washington grants many 
of the benefits of marriage to all cohabitants, both same- and opposite-sex, while 
Illinois extends no recognition at all to cohabitants, for fear that to do so would 
somehow denigrate the institution of marriage. 
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States, 26 LAw & POL'Y 119, 
119 (2004); id. at 146 ("The system as it now exists is clearly unstable. The various conflict oflaw 
problems ... import a built-in instability, as couples who have been granted either the status or 
incidents of marriage move from state to state."); Martha M. Ertman, Mamage as a Trade: 
Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 80 (2001) ("(A] patchwork 
of legal doctrines has emerged to regulate [relationships that fall outside the bounds of 
conventional family law]. In various jurisdictions, nonmarital affiliations are called reciprocal 
beneficiary relationships, domestic partnerships, meretricious relationships, and civil unions. 
Each affiliation is defined differently and accorded different rights and duties." (citations 
omitted)). 
145. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1421. 
146. Edmund L. Andrews, Survey Confirms It: Women Outjuggle Men, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 
2004, at A23. 
147. Jd. 
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. h th k' 148 M . d some twenty-e•g t percent more an wor mg women. any marne 
heterosexual couples with profiles resembling this national average conceive 
of themselves as merged economic units-they share their income and the 
tax system treats them accordingly. For these couples, the economic unity 
proposal would create an incentive to formalize a practice of sharing already 
in place, turning gratuitous spousal transfers into a legal obligation and 
giving low-earning wives who perform the brunt of the couples' housework 
the economic equality they deserve. More broadly, the system would also 
engender societal recognition that the non-wage labor of stay-at-home 
spouses and the monetary contributions of breadwinners are equally 
valuable. 
Married equal-earners would benefit from economic-unity-based 
income splitting because the proposal would completely eliminate the 
marriage penalty. 
For married unequal-earners who do not share fifty-fifty, the proposal 
would create an incentive to move towards egalitarian partnerships. Married 
high-earners who are not prepared to share their income with their spouses 
would face a tax hike which, though unpleasant, would be difficult to argue 
against. This Article does not pass judgment on such taxpayers; it simply 
insists that tax treatment match reality. If spouses do not share their income, 
they should not be treated as if they do for tax purposes. Low-earner 
spouses, meanwhile, would be free of potential liability on taxes for income 
they never owned. Finally, the economic unity proposal would eliminate 
marital-status discrimination from income taxes. In conclusion to his classic 
article, Bittker wrote: 
[T]heoreticians ... cannot 'solve' the problem of taxing family 
income. . . . They can identify the issues that must be resolved, 
point out conflicts among the objectives to be served, propose 
alternative approaches, and predict the outcome of picking one 
route rather than another. Having performed these functions, the 
expert must give way to the citizen, whose judgments in the end 
rest on nothing more precise or permanent than collective social 
£ 149 pre erences. 
This Article begins with the citizen. It recognizes that attitudes towards 
non-marital partnerships are in a state of unprecedented flux and that 
young Americans are increasingly receptive to alternative family structures. 
This Article also acknowledges that Americans are not prepared to ignore 
coupledom in favor of an individual-centered approach to taxation. The 
economic unity proposal accepts the income-splitting joint return as a 
permanent element of our system and insists that the criterion for its 
148. BUREAU OF lABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF lABOR, WOMEN'S EARNINGS 78 PERCENT 
OF MEN's IN 2002, http:/ /www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2003/oct/wk2/art03.hun. 
149. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1463. 
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application be true to its underlying justification: taxing all economically 
united couples-and only economically united couples-in a manner that 
respects and supports their partnership of equals. 
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VI. APPENDIX: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF INCOME SPLITTING, THE 
MARRIAGE BONUS, AND THE MARRIAGE PENALTY150 
In the early days of the income tax, all taxpayers were required to file 
individual (or "separate") returns and there was only one rate schedule. 
Mandatory separate filing meant that a married couple with one earner 
owed the same in taxes as a single person making the same amount. 
However, some one-earner couples who were legally obligated to share 
income equally argued that their tax liabilities should reflect their "income 
splitting" economic reality. 
To understand why one- and unequal-earner couples benefit from 
income splitting in a system with graduated tax rates, consider the following 
example. Assume that all taxable income up to $50,000 is taxed at a 10% 
rate, and all income above $50,000 is taxed at a 35% rate. Now consider Uri 
and Una ("U" for unequal earners). Uri earns $90,000 and Una earns 
$10,000. (Men often make significantly more than women, a fact which is an 
important piece of our story.) Uri's $90,000 will be taxed at two different 
rates. The first $50,000 will fall into the 10% bracket, while his top $40,000 
of income will be subject to the 35% rate. Una's $10,000 will be taxed at 10% 
in its entirety. 
Separate Filing 
URI UNA 
This is their tax treatment if they are treated as separate individuals. 
150. The text of this Appendix was inspired by MCCAFFERY, supra note 51, at 12-19. The 
graphics were designed by Jenny Chan. I am also thankful to Jonathan Corum .and Christopher 
Smith for their invaluable editorial suggestions. 
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But if they are allowed to "income split," $40,000 of Uri's income will be 
attributed to Una, shifting it from the 35% bracket into the 10% bracket. 
Income Splitting 
URI UNA 
Thus, income that was subject to the 35% rate is now subject to the 10% 
rate. 
Separate Filing with Income Splitting 
URI UNA 
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To calculate the value of the benefit, let us compare Uri and Una's 
combined tax liability with and without the income splitting benefit. 
Separate Filing 
URI UNA 
URI { Sso,ooo x 10% = Ss.ooo 
$40,000 X 35% = $14,000 
UNA $10,000 X 10% = $1,000 
tota I tax = $zo,ooo 
after tax income: $8o,ooo 
Separate Filing with Income Splitting 
URI UNA 
URI Sso,ooo x 10% = Ss,ooo 
UNA Sso,ooo x 10% = Ss,ooo 
tota I tax = $1o,ooo 
after tax income: $go,ooo 
The type of income splitting described above is often referred to as 
"pure income splitting," and initially, in 1930, the Supreme Court ruled that 
only couples in community-property states-who were required to share 
income pursuant to state property laws-would be eligible to income split in 
this way. 151 Couples in non-community property states, even if they signed a 
private contract binding them to share as much or even more than they 
would be required to under community property laws, were not permitted to 
income split.152 Thus, in 1930, Uri and Una's combined tax liability would be 
$10,000 if they lived in Texas but $20,000 if they lived next door in 
Oklahoma. 
151. SeePoev.Seaborn,282U.S.101 (1930). 
152. SeeLucasv. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
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In 1948, Congress extended "pure income splitting" to all married 
couples, regardless of where they lived and regardless of whether they were 
legally obligated to share their income. The 1948 Act did this by allowing 
married couples to aggregate or "stack" their income and file a joint return. 
Their combined marital income was then subject to a rate schedule 
composed of brackets that were twice as large as the brackets that made up 
the individual rate structure. Using our simplified example (in reality there 
were more than two brackets), a 1948-style married filing jointly schedule 
would tax combined I:'.arital income up to $100,000 at the 10% rate, and 
income above $100,000 at 35%. 
This 1948-style schedule for spouses filing jointly is the functional 
equivalent of the pre-1948 income splitting system available to spouses in 
community property states whereby spouses filed separately but the high-
earner's income was attributed to her low-earner spouse. Uri and Una would 
pay the same in taxes under either system, but the calculation would be 
different. Whereas before, Uri and Una split their income and then applied 
the individual rate structure, now they add their income and apply the rate 
structure with brackets twice as large. 
Pre-1948 Separate Filing 
with income splitting 
(available to married couples in 




1948-Style Joint Filing: 
rate brackets twice as large 
as individual brackets 




1948-style joint returns are also referred to as producing "pure income 
splitting" since they replicate the results of the pre-1948 system as it applied 
to married couples in community property states (i.e., "separate filing with 
income splitting"). 
We have already seen how pure income splitting created a significant 
"marriage bonus" for unequal earners like Uri and Una, who each paid the 
same m taxes as they would if they were two single taxpayers making 
$50,000. 
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Note that under the 1948-style system, equal-earner spouses enjoyed no 
advantage (or disadvantage) relative to their unmarried counterparts. 
Consider, e.g., Esteban and Edith who each earn $50,000. Since they already 
earn the same amount, they have no opportunity to shift high bracket 
income to a lower bracket; they already pay exactly the same as two single 
people making $50,000 each. 
Mter the 1948 reform, singles' rights advocates felt that the marriage 
bonus associated with pure income splitting unfairly discriminated against 
unmarried taxpayers. To address this concern, in 1969, Congress replaced 
"pure income splitting" with a new system that reduced the marriage bonus 
and inadvertently created a marriage penalty. 
The 1969 reform reduced the marriage bonus by adjusting the rate 
schedule applicable to married joint filers. (For simplicity, I will ignore the 
head of household and married filing separately categories. 153) Instead of 
taxing married couples using a schedule with rate brackets twice as large as 
those contained in the individual schedule-as was the case between 1948 
and 1969-married taxpayers would now be taxed based on a schedule with 




1948-Style Joint Filing' 
rate brackets twice as large 
as individual structure 
1g6g-Styleloint Filing' 
rate brackets less than twice as 
large as individual structure 
This structure produced a smaller bonus for one- and unequal-earner 
couples and created a penalty for equal earners. 
Keeping our hypothetical individual rate structure as a constant, a post-
1969 approach might set the 35% rate hike in the marrieds' schedule at 
$80,000. Thus, under the post-1969 style system, the unequal earners in our 
example still enjoy a benefit, because some of the $40,000 subject to the 35% 
153. See supra note 29. 
ANEW"IDO" 1565 
rate under the individual schedule still gets shifted into the lower 10% 
bracket. However, because the point at which the higher bracket kicks in in 
the joint filing structure-$80,000-is less than twice as large as the 
individual filing bracket-hike marker of $50,000, the maximal benefit of 
pure income splitting is no longer available. 
Separate Filing 
(Uri and Una unmarried) 
URI UNA 
1948-Style 








Equal-earner Esteban and Edith on the other hand, whose tax liability 
was unaffected by their marital status under 1948-style pure income splitting, 
now suffer a "marriage penalty" because they have no income to "split" 
(since they already earn the same amount) but they still have to move into 
the married filing jointly structure. 
In other words, income that was subject to the 10% bracket under the 
schedule applicable to unmarried taxpayers becomes subject to the higher, 
35% bracket, once Esteban and Edith marry. 
Separate Filing 
(Esteban and Edith unmarried) 
ESTEBAN EDITH 
1948-Style 




Married Filing Jointly 
EDITH 
ESTEBAN 
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The 2001 Revenue Act changed the post-1969 system by making the 
brackets applicable to married couples' aggregate income twice as large as 
those applicable to singles, but only at lower brackets. In other words, it 
returned pure income splitting at lower brackets but maintained, and in 
some cases exacerbated, the penalty for higher income equal earners. 
Specifically, the 10% and 15% brackets applicable to marrieds filing 
jointly are now twice as large as those applicable to singles, but starting at 
the margin between the 25% and the 28% rate brackets, the married 
brackets are less than twice as large as the individual brackets, producing a 
1969-style penalty. 
2006 Individual and Married Filing Jointly rate structures 
S3J6,550-188,450 
< 2 x IJJ6,550-154,8oo) 
$188,450-12),700 
< 2 X (154,800-74,200) 
$12J,700-61,JOO 
< 2 x (74,2oo-Jo,65o) 
$61,)00-15,100 




Thus, under 2001-style rates, Esteban and Edith suffer no marriage 
penalty if each spouse's taxable income is $30,000, 
2006 Joint Filing: 
No Marriage Penalty for Equal Earners at Lower Rate Brackets 
ESTEBAN 
ESTEBAN $7,550 X 10% 
+ $22,450 X 15% 
EDITH 
EDITH $7,550 X 10% 
+ $22,450 X 15% 
$4,122.5 
total tax, $8,245 




EDITH+ ESTEBAN $15,100 X 10% 
+ $44,900 X 15% 
$8,245 
total tax, $8,245 
after tax income' $51,755 
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... but if each spouse's taxable income is $300,000, they would be better off 
unmarried than married, i.e., they suffer a significant marriage penalty. 
2006 Joint Filing: Significant Marriage Penalty for High-Income Equal Earners 
ESTEBAN 
ESTEBAN $7,550 X 10% 
+ $23,100 X 15% 
+ $43,550 X 25% 
+ $8o,6oo x 28% 
+ $145,200 X 33% 
$85,591-5 
EDITH 
EDITH $7,550 X 10% 
+ $23,100 X 15% 
+ $43.550 X 25% 
+ $8o,6oo x 28% 
+ $145,200 X 33% 
$85.591-5 
total tax, $171,183 
after tax income: $428,817 
EDITH 
ESTEBAN 
EDITH+ ESTEBAN $15,100 X 10% 
+ S46,zoo x , s% 
+ $62,400 X 25% 
+ $64,750 X 28% 
+ $148,100 X 33% 
+ $263,450 X 35% 
total tax, $183,250.5 
aftertax income, $416,749.5 
